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Hungary is one of the most proactive kin-states in Europe. It has more than 2 million 
compatriots living in neighbouring countries. With around 250.000 ethnic Hungarians, the 
northern Serbian province of Vojvodina is no exception. Hungary as a kin-state has its own 
approach towards its kin-state politics, but that does not necessarily mean that its kin-minority 
shares the same priorities. The benefits that ethnic Hungarians abroad receive through kin-
state support are numerous and go as far as gaining the dual citizenship which provides them 
with the same, (if not more) rights than Hungarians from Hungary have. Why is that? The non-
resident citizenship right is followed by non-resident voting rights which represent a very 
powerful instrument in the hands of those who know how to use it, for instance, the Hungarian 
political party Fidesz. However, the specificity of Hungary’s kin-state support in Serbia is that 
the former is an EU state, whilst the latter is moving towards EU membership. Taking into 
account the existential problems of the minority community, having the opportunity to obtain 
the EU passport for Vojvodina Hungarians is significant and has led to large scale emigration. 
The consequences are not only related to the impossibility of long term survival of Hungarians 
in their historical lands, but also to making lives of the ones who remain even more 
complicated.  
This research will observe the connection between the aim of Hungarian kin-state 
support and the reality of being a kin-minority in Vojvodina. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the post World War I’s new geopolitical order and the 1920 Treaty of 
Trianon’s border changes, around 2.8 million ethnic Hungarians found themselves living beyond 
the new Hungarian state borders (Bessenyey-Williams, 2002). Today, the Hungarian diaspora 
counts approximately 5 million people, including Hungarians who migrated towards the West in 
search of a better life and the autochthonous Hungarian communities, living mostly in the 
neighbouring countries1. The most noticeable number of Hungarians lives in Romanian 
Transylvania, Slovak Horne Uhorsko (Upland/Upper Hungary), Serbian Vojvodina and Ukrainian 
Zakarpattia Oblast (Transcarpathia). The main focus of this research will be Hungarian minority 
in Serbian Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, where Hungarians with 251,136 people make up 
13% of the total population of the province (2011 Census of Population, Households and 
Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia). 
On its way towards becoming a modern and democratic European country, Serbia is 
obliged to take numerous measures regarding the protection of minority rights, their successful 
integration, and political participation. According to official census results, the Hungarian 
minority makes the second largest ethnic group in the country (excluding Albanians from 
Kosovo and Metohija), right after the Serbian majority. As such, the case of Hungarians serves 
as a good example for making conclusions about how successful the Serbian minority policy is. 
Also, it shows the current state of affairs between Serbia and neighbouring Hungary. The 
central theme of this paper is especially relevant today due to Serbia being in the EU 
integration process and the power of Hungary as an EU state to slow down this process if their 
authorities consider that the rights of Hungarians in Serbia are to any extent violated. Currently, 
the Hungarian government openly supports Serbia’s effort to join the EU (‘Hungary supports 
Serbia’s EU membership’, 2016). According to Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, the 
relationships of two neighbours are the best they have ever been in history (‘Odnosi Srbije i 
Mađarske najbolji u savremenoj istoriji’, 2020). This can especially be noticed in very close 
                                                             
1 Unlike international tendencies, Hungarian state policies as well as the relevant Hungarian literature traditionally 
make a crucial difference between Hungarian diaspora (created by outward migration) and minority communities 
(products of border changes). 
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personal relations between Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán and the Serbian President 
Vučić. 
One whole century passed from the Treaty of Trianon, but the bitter feeling of what can 
be seen as a historical injustice that was made to a certain degree still exists within the 
Hungarian nation. Different Hungarian governments came up with various strategies, actions 
and laws which served to keep Hungarians living abroad closer to the centre, i. e. Budapest. In 
2011, State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad published the Strategic Framework 
in which Hungarian government suggests the fundamental principles of Hungarian kin-state 
politics: “Hungary’s kin-state policies reflect that Hungary provides political, moral and financial 
support for Hungarian institutions and organisations beyond its borders, and establishes direct 
and active relationships with Hungarians abroad. This support, however, cannot counteract the 
disadvantages resulting from the economic situation in the neighbouring states but significantly 
contributes to the improvement of educational opportunities for Hungarians living in those 
countries, the functioning of civic organisations, and the preservation of cultural traditions” 
(Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad, 2011). The main purpose of such 
activities, according to the Hungarian government, is to primarily secure that the minority rights 
of their fellow compatriots abroad are being fully respected and that their unique Hungarian 
culture and language is being preserved properly. However, despite this being the main 
purpose, it is not the only reason why Budapest cares so much. This paper will try to point out 
also other features of the state support, which cost Budapest a notable amount of money and 
may undermine its good relations with the neighbours. 
The importance of keeping all Hungarians together led to, inter alia, the creation of the 
‘Hungarian Status Law’ in 2001. This rather controversial document faced a lot of criticism 
(Deets, 2008) and even resulted in the reformulation of the European norm on the legitimacy 
and limitations of the kin-state activism in various European countries (The protection of 
national minorities by their kin-state, 2002). These events, nevertheless, did not manage to 
decrease the level of the Hungarian government’s kin-state activism and already next year, new 
types of support were introduced. The main privilege that was about to be offered to the ethnic 
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Hungarians abroad was the simplified process of gaining the dual citizenship (Kis, 2004) which is 
from the beginning followed by various controversies and issues. Also, its final development in 
the last decade under the rule of Fidesz, when dual citizenship became a reality, makes room 
for its abuse from non-Hungarians even today. The central issue of such powerful right is 
related to the fact that Hungary as a kin-state is an EU member since 2004, and in the Schengen 
zone since 2007, while Serbia as a home state is still just an EU member candidate country. 
Therefore, Serbian citizenship holders have a more limited range of rights and benefits in 
comparison with the Hungarian ones. The question that emerges here and that will be 
examined throughout this research is related to also political purposes and interests behind 
such wide Hungarian kin-state support. The main contribution to the knowledge regarding this 
issue made Myra A. Waterbury’s 2010 book “Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and 
Kin-state Nationalism in Hungary”. 
A constant and direct connection, followed by some sort of dependency on the kin-state 
usually has a strong, a rather negative impact on these communities’ integration and the level 
of participation in their home state’s political and social life. This is especially a case when 
different levels of economical and social development of their kin and their home state are in 
place. It further results in noticeable emigration of Hungarians from their historical lands in 
today’s Serbia. This paper will also look at this phenomenon, its causes and consequences. The 
kin-state support, nevertheless, besides the benefits that Hungarian minority can gain, fails to 
meet and solve the most dominant problems that these communities face in their day-to-day 
life and indirectly or directly encourages their emigration. This research will identify the real 
problems of the Hungarian community in Serbia, seen from their perspective and the reality of 
what they get versus what they expect from their kin-state’s support. 
The importance of this research is significant, taking into account the fact that there is a 
lack of information and literature, especially in English, about the perspective of the actual 
Hungarian minority in Serbia towards the support that it gets from Budapest. Therefore, this 
paper will try to indicate and give recommendations regarding what matters to Vojvodina 
Hungarians and what are the consequences of such wide kin-state support. To do so, a 
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thorough analysis of different aspects of Hungarian kin-state support is needed and shall be 
applied to this particular case. The Hungarian kin-state activities are managed by a party that is 
driven by a considerable political interest from it and by strictly following its agenda, it can 
deliberately or not, turn a deaf ear to the actual problems of its kin-minority. This paper will 
hopefully contribute to the field of studying the kin-state activism, seen from the minority 
perspective, the group of people whose opinion matters the most and because of whom this 
support exists. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
 This research aims to identify, analyse, and better understand the background of 
Hungarian kin-state support and how it affects the life of Hungarians in Vojvodina. Therefore, 
the following research questions need to be analysed: 
A. What is the purpose of Hungarian kin-state support? 
B. What are the types of kin-state support that are offered to Vojvodina Hungarians? 
C. What are the main problems that the Hungarian minority in Serbia face? 
D. What is the reality of such wide kin-state support? 
The listed questions consist of a variety of sub-questions and facts that are crucial in 
reaching the aim of this research which is to draw attention to the reality of Hungarian kin-state 
support. 
A. What is the purpose of Hungarian kin-state support? 
To understand the whole issue better, it is necessary to explain the concept of kin-state 
support/kin-state activism and put it in the context of the Central and Eastern European region, 
more specifically, Hungary and Serbia. The complexity of this concept lays in both, historical and 
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contemporary needs for justice and power gaining. Some of the elements of such support are 
well-known and public, while others need more in-depth analysis. What are the ‘hidden’ 
interests of the Hungarian ruling party when it comes to their wide support towards minorities? 
A review of relevant literature is essential in defining this concept, its elements and as a final 
result - its purpose. The purpose will serve as a starting point and necessary link later for better 
understanding of the outcome of kin-state support in Vojvodina.  
B. What are the types of kin-state support that are offered to Vojvodina Hungarians? 
Identification of different types of Hungarian kin-state support is helping to get an 
overview of all the benefits that Hungarian minority get by birth, by their ethnic belonging, 
especially beyond the Hungarian state borders. How far can this support go? How does it 
influence their everyday lives? Are some of the benefits even greater than the ones that 
Hungarians in Hungary have? Are there any long term consequences? The matter of gaining 
Hungarian and by default the EU citizenship so easily, as the highest level of support is also the 
main subject of abuse by some non-Hungarians. This issue shows another side of the medal and 
it needs to be examined.  
C. What are the main problems that the Hungarian minority in Serbia face? 
The main institution that protects the rights of Hungarians in Serbia is the Hungarian 
National Council. But, people sometimes have the wrong image of their actual competence. 
One of the roles of the Hungarian National Council is to preserve the Hungarian culture in 
Serbia and ease the coexistence with their Serbian neighbours. Is this supposedly independent 
body compromised by the political interests? How this affects the lives of the national 
minority? Are the main problems of Hungarian communities in Serbia the same as the problems 
of the general population? What is a specific of those Serbian Hungarians who do not speak the 
Serbian language well enough? Many people consider emigration as an ultimate solution for all 
the problems. But, what causes such a life-changing decision? 
D. What is the reality of such wide kin-state support? 
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Hungarians in Serbia live very compactly and represent an absolute or relative majority 
in several municipalities. Also, they are very well organised and tend to stay close. This 
homogeneity, however, has its issues. What does the Serbian state do wrong in addressing 
these issues? There is a considerable difference between what the state of Hungary offers as a 
support and what the Hungarian minority in Serbia needs. The necessity for more study on the 
latter one is the reason why this research is so valuable. Bearing in mind how important is the 
minority opinion on the ground, the answer to this research question will stress how significant 
can be the consequences of not understanding the reality on time. Also, an overview of the 
reality will answer how successful kin-state support is, in general. 
Getting the answers to these research questions not only helps in reaching the aim of 
this research but also represents a crucial element of the objectives of it. The objectives are as 
follow: 
 Collecting and analysing the information on kin-state activism, understanding the 
reasons and purpose of it; putting the kin-state activism in the context of Hungary. 
 Using the raw data to depict the actual reality of human experience on the ground; 
defining and pointing out the importance of the research problem. 
 Reaching the aim of the research by answering the research questions, using the already 
existing literature and the raw, primary data. 
 Analysing the data to make conclusions and recommendations, necessary for solving the 
research problem. 
For this research, the interpretive approach will be used. Scholars supporting 
interpretivism consider the reality to be multiple and relative (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). 
Another characteristic of this approach is that “the knowledge acquired in this discipline is 
socially constructed rather than objectively determined” (Carson, David et al., 2001, p. 5). The 
structural framework is more flexible, while the goal of such approach is “to understand and 
interpret the meanings in human behaviour rather than to generalize and predict causes and 
effects” (Edirisingha, 2012, p. 1). Therefore, this paper will try to extend the knowledge by 
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understanding the issue/phenomenon, making conclusions and recommendations; rather than 
offer the single external reality, as in positivist research approach. 
 
1.2 Conceptual framework 
Defining the diverse segments of Hungarian kin-state support in Serbia is one of the 
central tasks of this paper. Several factors influence the kin-state support and what effect will it 
have towards the ‘object’, that is the Hungarian minority and its issues. This research will 
measure if the kin-state support, with all its features, is capable of solving the main problems of 
the Hungarian minority in Serbia. The variable ‘kin-state support’ as part of wider ‘kin-state 
activism’ and ‘kin-state politics’ concepts, in case of this study, will cover all the means used by 
the government in Budapest to protect the rights of Hungarians from Vojvodina and keep them 
closer to their ‘ethnic’ homeland. An important focus will be on the political component of this 
support. 
This research will be focusing on a single case study - the reality and the outcome of the 
actions of the Hungarian government towards the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and their 
actual issues. From this case, several variables can be obtained. Primarily, an independent 
variable would be: 
 IV: The (Hungarian) kin-state support 
This variable will be examined and the concept of kin-state support will be defined by 
secondary sources. The specificity of Hungarian kin-state support or activism will also be 
examined within the literature review of this research. A dependent variable is: 
 DV: The (Vojvodina Hungarian) minority 
The dependent variable will be examined and the concept of the national minority will 
be explained by secondary sources. The example of Vojvodina Hungarians as a national 
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minority will be explored by secondary data analysis within the literature review chapter and 
primary data analysis within the empirical research chapter of this paper. Many supplementary 
variables are necessary for a better understanding of the connection and correlation between 
the independent and dependent variables. The supplementary variables linked to the 
independent variable are: 
 SV1: The purpose of Hungarian kin-state support 
 SV2: The political interest of kin-state 
All of the supplementary variables mentioned above will be examined in more detail in 
the literature review. Another set of supplementary variables are related to the dependent 
variable and they are: 
 SV3: The (Vojvodina Hungarian) minority issues 
 SV4: The outcome of Hungarian kin-state support 
Two listed supplementary variables will also be studied as part of the empirical segment 
of this research and they are the ones defining the dependent variable. All six variables 
mentioned playing an important role in this research. Also, they are crucial for deriving the 
hypotheses. The suggested hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: The more the kin-state support focuses on political interests, the more of actual issues 
of (Vojvodina Hungarian) minority are unsolved. 
H2: The more issues a minority faces in the home country, the more support it expects from 
kin-state. 
H3: The more the minority relies on and uses the support of a kin-state, the more likely is to 
be caught in the middle between the kin-state and home state. 
H4: The more privileges kin-state support offers to its minority in another country, the more 
is the minority encouraged to leave the home state. 
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The further empirical research will approve, disapprove or adjust the suggested 
hypotheses. This research study will be factor oriented and its arrow diagram would look as 
follows: 
         
The type of a case study that is sought to be delivered in this paper is closest to 
Hypothesis-generating study. This type of study is a standard case study and involves collecting 
primary data from research participants concerning a certain phenomenon, in this case, the 
Hungarian kin-state support and then using what has been said as a tool to develop justified 
hypotheses. The principal that is characteristic for this study is questioning rather than 
measuring, which will be the case with this particular research as well. Also, such a study could 
be followed up with other, greater-N studies. In this single case study, a larger-N study can be 
developed towards the other countries in the region with a notable Hungarian population, e. g. 
Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. The differences in each case also can be found in each country’s 
relationship with the EU and Schengen zone. Slovakia is part of both, Romania is only an EU 
member and Ukraine is not part of any. Therefore, all of these single cases can become a part 
of some future research. 
 
1.2.1 Conceptualisation: Kin-state support 
The main concept that can be derived and that is relevant for this study is the 






Outcome of kin-state support 
Minority issues Purpose of kin-state support 
Political interest of kin-state 
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secondary sources from already existing literature, while the empirical chapter of this paper will 
further contribute to the field by exploring this concept in the case of Vojvodina Hungarians. 
There are several definitions regarding the ‘kin-state politics’ and ‘kin-state activism’, where the 
phenomenon of Hungarian kin-state support fits in. This paper will select the applicable data 
and information and define the concept and the particular phenomenon as precisely as 
possible, considering the lack of theoretical background. The scholars and analysts focus more 
on the practical implications of kin-state activism in general than on its theoretical aspects. 
Firstly, the term ‘kin-state’2 should be looked at and how Hungary fits in. Singh explains 
broadly the term ‘kin-state’ as a country that usually borders or is very close to the region 
where a significant population of its co-nationals lives. Kin-states actively preserve shared 
ethnocultural and ethnoreligious ties with their ethnic kin across the state borders (Singh, 
2006). Palermo argues that it is acceptable for a kin-state to be interested in their ethnic kin 
abroad and to take action towards improving the community’s status and general well-being. 
The ethnic kin of a certain kin-state is a community that has the same defining elements that 
also define the kin-state majority population, such as common language, ethnicity and religion 
(Palermo & Sabanadze, 2011). The kin-state activities as such do not have any particular legally 
defined limits, except for general ones such as respect of territorial integrity and good 
neighbouring relations (Sabanadze, 2006).  
The concept ‘kin-state support’ in this case is part of ‘kin-state politics’ and ‘kin-state 
activism’ definitions and represents nothing else than a form, main type or even a synonym of 
the latter two, according to the literature. The definition of kin-state activism or kin-state 
politics, with special attention to the Hungarian one, was developed in various works of Myra A. 
Waterbury (2010; 2014; 2020), Szabolcs Pogonyi (2011; 2015; 2017), as well as, Zoltán Kántor 
(2004) and Zsuzsa Csergő and James Goldgeier (2013), etc. Several definitions of kin-state 
politics could be drawn3 and they describe this concept as follows: “kin-state politics cover 
actions to engage and protect the so-called ethnic kin communities in neighbouring or nearby 
                                                             
2 Synonyms used in this paper: Hungarian government; Budapest. 
3 Some of them are very closely related to ethnic politics. 
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states” (Waterbury, 2014, p. 36). Waterbury also groups kin-state politics’ actions as: “political-
legal (legal and diplomatic advocacy), economic (launching financial aid or other business 
oriented programme), cultural (establishment and funding of kin community educational, 
cultural, etc. institutions, scholarship programme) and symbolic (the inclusion of co-ethnics e.g. 
by offering citizenship)” (Tátrai, Erőss, & Kovály, 2017, p. 204). 
There are, however, also other definitions, according to which kin-state politics’ main 
role is to serve as a grant of a fast-track non-resident or external ethnic citizenship of a kin-state 
country. For instance, Hungarian kin-state support went so far in its offers to ethnic kin that it 
grants full kin-state citizenship to ethnic Hungarians who do not reside, and never resided in 
the kin-state. This particular form of ethnic citizenship is seen by many as controversial since it 
can represent a threat to the territorial sovereignty of the countries where these non-resident 
citizens live4 (Kovács E., 2017). Additionally, it is opposite to common understandings of popular 
sovereignty, by which all citizens are linked to one another and home state by their civic rights 
and not their ethnic affinity (Pogonyi, 2011). 
The general kin-state politics target two main groups: transborder ethnic communities 
and ethnic diasporas. Transborder ethnic groups emerged as a result of border shifts5, so these 
communities became minorities within newly formed state borders due to geopolitical changes 
and not because they wanted it (Pogonyi, 2011). Ethnic diasporas, on the other hand, represent 
a group of people who consciously migrated due to economic or security reasons and they 
usually live far from their home country6. As such, kin-state politics involve three parties: the 
home state, the kin-state, and most importantly, the minority group that is in the middle 
between the two7 (Brubaker, 1996). The kin-state support that is subject of this paper is only 
related to transborder ethnic groups. 
Sabanadze suggests the typology of kin-state activism. According to her, there are three 
dominant types of kin-state activism: a) nationalist, b) geopolitical and c) normative. 
                                                             
4 e.g. Romania and Slovakia opposed the law, claiming that it violates their territorial sovereignty. 
5 e.g. Poland, Hungary, Germany. 
6 e.g. Armenian, ex-Yugoslav or Turkish diasporas in Western Europe. 
7 See Brubaker’s triadic nexus, field’s most famous model for studying the national questions in CEE. 
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A) Nationalist type is when a kin-state includes kin-minorities in their national building 
process. In this case, kin-state politics are equally shaped by ethnic kin issues and internal 
political discussion. An example of nationalist kin-state is Hungary; 
B) Geopolitical type of kin-state activism implies that kin-state uses kin-minorities in 
another state for its geopolitical interests. The kin-state’s influence on ethnic kin serves as a 
tool for pressure on ethnic kin’s home state. An example given is Russia and the concerns of its 
political standing and securing the regional influence; 
C) Normative type is the least problematic type and it refers to kin-state politics which 
support a co-operation between respective institutions of kin and host state. Normative kin-
state politics aim to respect and improve minority rights. The examples are Austria’s and Italy’s 
actions in the South Tyrol region (Sabanadze, 2006). 
Kin-state politics aim to provide the ethnic kin abroad with the moral, political and 
financial support, to contribute to its nation-building and engage in the issue of minority’s ‘self-
perception’ (Kántor, 2006). Also, kin-state politics serve to advocate the proactive cross-border 
interaction, and ultimately to allow the ethnic kin to move to the kin-state, or just gain the 
citizenship and external voting rights (Csergő & Deegan-Krause, 2011). Kin-state politics include 
all kin-state’s projects, programmes, activities, and the nature of the relationship with its kin-
minority. Kin-state politics represent a mixture of political (dual citizenship, external voting 
rights, representation), financial/economical (grants offered to kin-minority) and 
cultural/educational (preservation of language and culture) means of support. An elementary 
aim of kin-state support represents the protection of minority language rights. The importance 
of protecting the mother tongue of the minority communities is recognised internationally and 
by the EU and it represents a fundamental human right (Kapitány, 2015). Further analysis of 
primary data of this research will test this idea and how applicable it is in the case of Vojvodina 
Hungarians. 
The studies on ‘kin-state politics’ answer why, how, and how much kin-states engage 
with their ethnic kin abroad. Also, it focuses on defining the possible consequences of kin-state 
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activities8. The kin-state politics’ activities tend to have a very strong impact on domestic and 
international affairs, and as such is a very important field of study. According to Myra A. 
Waterbury, there are few groups of studies that are related to kin-state politics:  
a) external state support for rebellious minorities and their movements in civil wars and 
secessionists in their fights for control, autonomy, or independence;  
b) the protection of native language rights as an aspect of kin-state support;  
c) the externalization of identity and the right to dual citizenship.  
Nevertheless, kin-state politics is a concept that could be identified with broader studies 
of irredentism and diaspora politics, or even minority rights and identity, since it can represent 
one of the subjects of listed theories. (Waterbury, 2020)  
 
1.2.2 Conceptualisation: Kin-minority 
The concept of kin-minority merges the concepts of national minority and diaspora, 
since the former studies the position of kin-minority in its home state, while the latter analyses 
its relation to kin-state. The universal formulation of what a ‘minority’ represents does not 
exist, due to many differences and unique features of every single case. Because of this, every 
country creates its politics and approach to defining, recognising, and dealing with a minority 
group (Porter, 2003). Nevertheless, Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the United 
Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
suggested a definition in which a minority was described as: “A group numerically inferior to the 
rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals 
of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest 
of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving 
their culture, traditions, religion or language” (Capotorti, 1979, p. 96). 
                                                             
8 The activities taken by kin-states on behalf of their ethnic kin in other countries. 
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On the other hand, the literature recognises two major groups of minorities: ‘old’ or 
‘autochthonous’ and ‘new’ minorities9. The distinction is related to how long a minority has 
been living in a certain territory; if it became a minority due to historical reasons or consciously. 
This paper focuses further only on autochthonous minority communities and their engagement 
with kin-state. When defining the minority, the right categorisation of it, led by the home state 
plays a very important role, because it can be influenced by political interests. The way the 
home state defines the minority and what is more important, who belongs to it, is key for a 
minority community’s cultural development. This recognition by the home state gives to a 
certain minority group or individual the access to resources given by the home state or kin-
state. The rights and resources granted to the minority groups are directly dependent on how 
the home state measures and defines the minority and who can declare to be part of one 
(Dembinska, Máracz, & Tonk, 2014). 
  Will Kymlicka suggests a definition of a minority that is relevant for this study and 
defines them as a “distinct and potentially self-governing societies incorporated into a larger 
state” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 19). Kymlicka also argues that despite missing the universal definition 
of a national minority, two main criteria characterize a national minority - the objective and 
subjective one. He describes them as: “The objective criterion is the empirical presence of a 
distinct societal culture in the form of a common language, religion and ethnicity. The subjective 
criterion requires that the national minority think of themselves as collectively possessing a 
separate identity that they wish to preserve” (Galenkamp, 1996, p. 42). 
Zoltán Kántor argues that members of the national minority have a unique perception of 
their belonging. They do consider themselves to be the part of one nation with the kin-state’s 
majority nation, due to the common language, culture, history and ethnicity. But, they are still 
aware of their position and status of a national minority in another country, usually 
neighbouring country. When these two perceptions are put together, they can define what a 
national (kin) minority is (Kántor, 2006, p. 159). 
                                                             
9 However, in many cases, this distinction has been increasingly challenged, since one can hardly make a clear-cut 
boundary between these two types of communities: ‘new’ groups have managed to gain official recognition as ‘old’ 
minorities (Czech Republic) or there are ‘new’ layers within the ‘old’ groups (Hungary), etc. 
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One of the most relevant definitions of a minority is given by Rogers Brubaker. He 
suggests that a minority is “not simply a ‘group’ that is given by the facts of ethnic demography. 
It is a dynamic political stance, or, more precisely, a family of related yet mutually competing 
stances, not a static ethno demographic condition. Three elements are characteristic of this 
political stance, or family of stances: (1) the public claim to membership of an ethno cultural 
nation different from the numerically or politically dominant ethno cultural nation; (2) the 
demand for state recognition of this distinct ethno cultural nationality; and (3) the assertion, on 
the basis of this ethno cultural nationality, of certain collective cultural or political rights” 
(Brubaker, 1996, p. 60). The majority of articles on national minority refer to the Brubaker’s 
definitions, so his contribution to the field is irreplaceable. 
Some national minorities do not have their kin-state to get the support from, so not 
every national minority can be defined as a kin-minority10. What is common for the CEE region 
is that it has a rich history of kin-state activism and many minority groups have a status of kin-
minorities. This is a result of border changes, different regimes collapse, and unions’ 
dissolutions in the 20th century, which led to intensive nation-building activities. The significant 
number of kin-minorities exists in CEE kin-states neighbouring countries and they usually need 
to keep the balance between their kin and host state (Kovács E. , 2020). 
One of the pioneers in the area of conceptualising used the example of family ties to 
describe the kin-minorities. According to him, kin-minorities can be seen as ethnic ‘relatives’ of 
the kin-state (Walzer, 1983). On the other hand, Waterbury uses the term kin-minority to 
indicate the group of national minorities that were created due to the major geopolitical events 
of 20th century - The World Wars and the fall of communism (Waterbury, 2010, p. 18). Authors 
as Wolff use the term ‘external minorities’ to explain the kin-minorities. He describes kin-
minorities as “minorities that, while living on the territory of one state (host-state) 11 are 
ethnically akin to the titular nation of another, often neighbouring, state (kin-state)” (Wolff, 
2002, p. 3). 
                                                             
10 Synonym used in this paper: Ethnic kin. 




The second chapter of this research ‘Literature review’ will consist of the theoretical 
research, which represents an indispensable tool needed for defining the phenomenon of kin-
state activism, providing a historical background of Hungarian kin-state support and finally 
narrow it down to the Vojvodina Hungarian’s case. It is necessary to better understand the 
purpose and hidden motives around the phenomenon, which are crucial when comparing it 
with the outcomes of kin-state activism, perceived by the minority itself. The first two research 
questions will be answered by using the reviewed literature. The chapter will be structured in 
the following thematic units: 
 Historical background, Hungarian nation concept 
 Hungarian kin-state support, before and after 2010 
 The political aspect of Hungarian kin-state activism 
 Hungarian kin-minorities 
Besides the literature written or officially translated into English, the theoretical part of 
this research will also contain small elements gained from reports, articles, interviews and news 
sources originally written in Serbian. The literature review will consist of secondary data sets, 
which will be reviewed initially using libraries of the University of Glasgow and Institute for 
Minority Studies, Centre for Social Sciences of Hungarian Academy of Sciences (3rd mobility 
placement), by using the general sources of information, e. g. the web search engines, the 
OPAC system, academic abstracts, bibliographic databases, etc. 
At the end of the second chapter, an introduction to the Hungarian minority in 
Vojvodina will be made, using secondary sources. Having an introduction as this is important 
since it gives all the necessary information and the overall picture of the Hungarian minority in 
Serbia. It will contain the information on their numbers, how well are they represented in the 
Serbian political and social life and what are the main institutes and elements of their 
protection. This knowledge is needed for a better understanding of the empirical data that 
follows it in the next chapter. 
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The third chapter is dedicated to empirical research. This data collection and sampling 
serves to test present-day practice over the historical record.  
The primary source data that will be used and analysed to accomplish the aims and 
objectives are the qualitative, unused interview materials received from still unpublished 
research of this paper’s supervisor and University of Glasgow professor, David Smith. The title 
of the research is “National Minority Rights & Democratic Political Community: Practices of 
Non-territorial Cultural Autonomy in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe”. The access to 
this dataset was arranged through the UK Data Service. The raw data relevant for this particular 
paper are transcripts of in-depth, semi-structured interviews (Smith, 2020) conducted by 
Professor Smith and his team between 2014 and 2017. The set of primary data that will be used 
is only the one regarding the Hungarians in Serbia. The interviews cover the opinions of 
representatives of minority cultural autonomy bodies, such as Hungarian National Council; 
representatives of leading Hungarian political parties in Serbia, state officials involved in the 
design and implementation of minority policy, members of the Parliament and academic 
experts working on issues of cultural autonomy and minority rights. All of the interviews were 
initially requested with key individuals and institutions, with a snowballing method that was 
used to identify other relevant contacts, once the fieldwork started. The fieldwork in Serbia 
lasted from 13 until 19 May 2016.  
For this type of research, when the perspective of a certain social group is observed, the 
qualitative data has an advantage over the quantitative. Hence, this research is qualitative. The 
decision to use the transcripts mentioned above lays in the fact that they are the only 
interviews that were conducted among Hungarians in Vojvodina and provide the most realistic, 
direct, and up-to-date information regarding the wide range of issues that the Hungarian 
minority face. The only similar researches that conducted interviews among Hungarians in 
Serbia and were published recently are Lendák-Kabók & Lendák’s “Language barrier faced by 
Hungarian women students and teaching staff in the higher education system in Serbia”  and 
Pogonyi’s “The passport as means of identity management: making and unmaking ethnic 
boundaries through citizenship”. They indeed cover the issues relevant to the kin-state support, 
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such as the language use (Lendák-Kabók & Lendák, 2017) and dual citizenship (Pogonyi, 2019), 
however, they are very specific and cannot be used for creating a wider picture on the multiple 
issues of the Hungarian community in Vojvodina. 
Certain minor limitations were identified and they are mostly related to a slight 
mismatch between the main topic of David Smith’s research, i.e. cultural autonomy; and this 
particular research. The most questions that were addressed do not directly give the answers 
on Hungarian kin-state support, but the thorough analysis of the responses give all the 
information necessary for answering the research questions and reaching the aims of this 
research. The experts’ responses, directly and indirectly, mention Hungarian kin-state support 
on numerous occasions, although without always naming it as such. That is why the theoretical 
part of this research which applies the concept of kin-state politics to the Hungarian case and 
analyses the types of kin-state support, plays a significant role as a starting point for the further 
analysis. 
The total of 12 interviewees will be classified into three groups: Political party 
representatives (4), Hungarian National Council representatives (6), and Vojvodina Provincial 
officials (2). Therefore, there are three sets of questions. Each set of questions is made 
according to the function they occupy. This will help to identify the differences and similarities 
in perspectives towards the same issues. In the case of political party representatives, the 
interviews were conducted among the representatives of four different political parties, which 
have opposing opinions and different levels of relationship with political fractions in Hungary 
and Serbia. Among the party representatives, the former or current members of the Serbian 
Parliament can be found. This is a very important segment of this research since it will not give 
a unanimous, somewhat subjective elite perspective, but rather a more realistic. The same is 
the case with Hungarian Council Representatives, where interviewees are both, political 
activists and civilians who were selected to represent and protect rights of Serbian Hungarians. 
The questions that are relevant to this particular research and that were asked among 
the others are as follow: 
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Relevant questions to the political party representatives 
Q 1.1:  ‘Does Hungary support HNC directly or indirectly now? If yes, how?’ 
Q 1.2:  ‘What do you think about granting Hungarian citizenship to minorities?’ 
Q 1.3:  ‘Does it raise the danger that those with Hungarian citizenship will seek to migrate to 
other EU countries?’ 
Q 1.4:  ‘Will this undermine the position/future of Hungarian minorities in the region?’ 
 
Relevant questions to the representatives of the Hungarian National Council 
Q 2.1:  ‘What are the HNC’s main activities/programs?’ 
Q 2.2:  ‘What are the main issues/challenges facing the community?’ 
Q 2.3: ‘How much funding does the council receive and from whom?’ 
Q 2.4: ‘How would you describe the relationship between HNC and local and state 
authorities?’ 
Q 2.5: ‘How is Hungarians’ relation with kin-state? Do they support financially HNC directly or 
indirectly?’ 
Q 2.6: ‘What do you think how important is HNC for minority/nationality groups’ life?’ 
 
Relevant questions to Vojvodina Provincial officials 
Q 3.1:  
 
‘What do you think about granting the Hungarian citizenship to Serbian citizens who 
can prove to have Hungarian ancestors, does it not raise the danger to migrate or 
cause other issues in the area?’ 
Q 3.2: ‘What can you do about the general problems minority citizens have? What can you do 
when they come to you? 
 
The responses on listed questions, as well as the ones that came up as a result of 
questions about the Non-Territorial Cultural Autonomy (not listed above), are essential for 
answering the final two research questions, making conclusions and giving recommendations. 
The expert interviewees provided responses on the condition of anonymity. Accordingly, they 
will be referred to as follows: 
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№ Codename Function Place Date 
1 SERB-1.1.1 
Political party representative (VMSZ); 
member of the Serbian Parliament 
Subotica, 
Serbia 
19 May 2016 
2 SERB-1.1.2 
Political party representative (MM);  
former member of the Serbian Parliament 
Subotica, 
Serbia 
17 May 2016 
3 SERB-1.2.1 Political party representative (VMDK) 
Ada,         
Serbia 
18 May 2016 
4 SERB-1.3.1 Political party representative (VMDP) 
Temerin, 
Serbia 
18 May 2016 
5 SERB-2.1.1 Member of Hungarian National Council 
Subotica, 
Serbia 
May 2016 (no exact 
date provided) 
6 SERB-2.1.2 Member of Hungarian National Council 
Subotica, 
Serbia 
17 May 2016 
7 SERB-2.1.3 Member of Hungarian National Council 
Subotica, 
Serbia 
19 May 2016 
8 SERB-2.1.4 Member of Hungarian National Council 
Subotica, 
Serbia 
16 May 2016 
9 SERB-2.2.1 Member of Hungarian National Council 
Bačka Topola, 
Serbia 
17 May, 2016 
10 SERB-2.3.1 Member of Hungarian National Council 
Bečej,      
Serbia 
May 2016 (no exact 
date provided) 
11 SERB-3.1.1 Vojvodina Provincial Official 
Novi Sad, 
Serbia 
13 May 2016 
12 SERB-3.1.2 Vojvodina Provincial Official 
Novi Sad, 
Serbia 
13 May 2016 
The analysis of the findings allowed the categorising of the responses, which identified 
recurring themes, patterns and issues. The final, fourth chapter of this research will provide 
overall conclusions and recommendations for solving each set of issues. 
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Historical background 
On the way towards a better understanding of the contemporary Hungarian kin-state 
activism, it is necessary to go a few steps back and look at the nature and development of 
Hungarian nationalism first. The government policy related to the protection of Hungarians 
abroad is based on the concept of the nation; therefore it is very important to understand the 
complexity of the Hungarian nation concept. The first thing that is evident about Hungarians is 
their unique language, history and ancestry. While other countries in Europe usually neighbour 
nations that share deep historical and language roots with, this is not the case with Hungary. 
The Hungarian case is also unique because Hungary as a state is ethnically very homogeneous, 
but it has a large number of ethnic kin living in neighbouring countries. This is a result of 1920 
Treaty of Trianon, which followed the end of World War I and left around 2.8 million ethnic 
Hungarians living outside the Hungarian state borders (Bessenyey-Williams, 2002) today, 
mostly in Romania (Transylvania), Slovakia (Horne Uhorsko), Serbia (Vojvodina) and Ukraine 
(Zakarpattia Oblast). This historical event is one of the reasons why kin-state activism plays a 
special role in Hungarian politics. 
The Hungarian nationalism has roots that go far back in time, way before the Treaty of 
Trianon. For instance, under the Habsburg Empire, Hungary did not have the status of a 
sovereign state and had to fight for its place and the recognition of language and culture 
(Egedy, 2013). What is characteristic of this period, according to Myra A. Waterbury, is that 
Hungarian national identity “was not defined primarily in ethnic or culturo-linguistic terms, nor 
was a unified, contiguous Hungarian nation-state long in the making by the time state and 
nation were split in two. Until the later decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Hungarian nationalism was more political than culturo-linguistic, more 
territorial than ethnic, and driven more by the political calculations of the ruling noble classes 
than by the bonds of ethnic affiliation” (Waterbury, 2010, p. 26). Today, Hungarians from 
neighbouring countries have a right to their language and culture but do not have the level of 
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autonomy that is desired and has been a declared goal of Hungary’s foreign policy and the new 
constitution (Egry, 2014). That is why the fight for wider rights and autonomy can be seen 
through the Budapest’s kin-state activism today. 
The Treaty of Trianon served as a ‘trigger’ that increased the level of nationalism and it 
is connected with the Hungarian kin-state activism that we know today. The loss of two-thirds 
of the territory left trauma to Hungarians and in years that followed the revision of the treaty 
and regaining of the lost territories represented one of the biggest political goals of the 
Hungarian governments. Usually, the concept of a common culture of the nation was used as a 
tool to promote membership in the nation. Authors as Bárdi suggest eight periods of Hungarian 
national policy starting with the post World War I period and ending up with passing the Status 
Law in the early 2000s (Bárdi, 2004). Another period that could be added today would refer to 
the last decade, the rule of Fidesz, and the new constitution of 2011. The new kin-state policy is 
in place since and it is based on nation-building across the borders, as well as a new level of 
relations with the ethnic kin, who now has a right to participate in political decisions in Hungary 
and broader EU by voting at EP elections; and can obtain the dual citizenship. 
The political situation in Central and Eastern Europe, more than 30 years after the fall of 
communism and more than 15 years after some of the countries joined the EU (and by default 
passed the test on the level of democracy), still seems very intense and it is subject for many 
debates. The populism and some sort of neo-nationalism are on the rise, so the phenomenon of 
kin-state activism came to focus in recent years. This is especially the case in CEE region, where 
countries still tend to engage in transnational national building and seek to reconstruct the 
feeling of national belonging, which was lost due to many years under the communist rule. A 
certain revival of ethnic identity occurred as ‘new’ countries rediscovered their ethnic roots. 
One of the strategies that were common in the post-communist period was related to the 
reconstruction of narratives about the nation and strengthening the ethnic identity via the 
inclusion of ethnic kin from abroad in the nation (Brubaker, 1996). The works of Rogers 
Brubaker are significant for a better understanding of ‘nationalizing’ states and the 
reformulating of the concept of nationalism in the 1990s. 
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The scholars agree that the regime change in CEE countries brought the redefinition of 
nation concept, which now also includes the ethnic kin living outside the country. Culic argues 
that the breakdown of authoritarian regimes is followed by the increased interest of politics to 
deal with the issue of the nation, laws on citizenship, and definitions of a nation in the 
constitution. All of this legislation is referred to as assertive nationalism (Culic, 2003). If 
compared with the current situation in Hungary and its kin-state politics, it can be seen that the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary of 201112 does exactly that. 
The specificity of Central and Eastern Europe is that many nations, how we know them 
today, were formed after the empires and later communist federations collapsed and many 
national groups suddenly became national minorities in the newly formed states13. Minorities, 
as well as their kin-states, engaged in nation-building also, by formulating the political goals 
along with the cultural ones. This means that they required the creation of their institutional 
network, which helped and still helps in creating and preserving their ethnic identity. Also, they 
had to ensure their political representation, by transforming the internal politics of their home 
state. (Kántor, 2004) 
It seems that in post-communist CEE, nationalism represents one of the main principles 
of nation-building, the ideal of the nation is very important and its significance does not 
decrease. It modifies over time, but it remains an important principle. The politics related to the 
nationalism are oriented towards building up strong ties with titular or majority nation and 
usually promoting, to a certain extent, unfriendly politics towards the national minorities 
(Kántor, 2006). 
Will Kymlicka argues, what is characteristic for Hungarian neighbours, where Hungarian 
minorities live, is that most of them became new nation-states in the 1990s and were going 
through the intensive process of nation-building. When such a process exists, the nationalism 
rises to the surface and represents a major challenge to national minorities. In such societies, 
                                                             
12 Republic of Hungary Constitution. 
13 All the neighbouring countries with considerable Hungarian population, with the exception of Romania, were part 




the promotion of majority culture and language is dominant, so the titular nation is not obliged 
to prevent the assimilation of minorities (Kymlicka, 1995). Adding to that, the years during the 
communist regime also did not do anything positive concerning preserving national identities. 
On the contrary, the pressure of assimilation was very high, and back then was not possible for 
Hungarians to turn to their kin-state and ask for help. And in Budapest, under János Kádár’s 
communism, a nationalist policy was not pursued and many generations of Hungarians were 
not even aware of their compatriots in neighbouring states. Thus, it is understandable why 
Hungarian governments in recent history are still so interested in keeping their minority closer 
to the centre - Budapest. 
Schöpflin wrote that all of the events that had some sort of ‘anti-Hungarian’ edge in the 
last century were expected to be met with inertia, passivity, and resulting in Hungarians 
accepting their fate. But, Hungarian minorities were still identifying themselves with the 
Hungarian state and were constantly looking towards its direction. The only detachment that 
Hungarians abroad faced was related to their Hungarian political identity (Schöpflin, 2006). 
However, the political situation changed after 1989 and especially when Fidesz came to power 
for the first time in 1998 and the Hungarian political identity in neighbouring countries was 
‘revived’. Today, after 10 years of renewed political dominance of Fidesz14, Orbán enjoys wide 
support of Hungarians abroad, who are now included in the Hungarian state’s internal political 
decision making. 
 
2.2 Hungarian kin-state activism 
The literature on kin-state politics agrees that the Hungarian state represents one of the 
most active and dynamic kin-states in the CEE region. This is not a surprise, taking into account 
that at the moment around 2.2 million ethnic Hungarians live in the countries neighbouring 
Hungary and represent their ethnic kin abroad (Kapitány, 2015). Due to such a large number of 
ethnic kin living along the state borders, Hungary represents an extraordinary case in the centre 
                                                             
14 Came back to power in 2010. 
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of Europe. Such complex kin-state politics have been a significant factor of general Hungarian 
domestic and foreign politics in the last decades, and indirectly the matter of the neighbouring 
countries where Hungarian minority communities live. 
Besides the studies under which Hungarian kin-state politics could be examined and that 
are suggested earlier by Waterbury15, the phenomenon of kin-state activism and actions which 
serve to unify the nation no matter where it lives is usually studied under theories of trans-
sovereign and transnational nationalism. The significant contributions to these two theories are 
the works of Csergő and Goldgeier, Pogonyi and Egedy. In their works, they use Hungary as an 
example.  
Csergő and Goldgeier explain that trans-sovereign nationalism “applies to nations that 
reach beyond current state boundaries but forgo the idea of border changes, primarily because 
it is too costly to pursue border changes in contemporary Europe” (Csergő & Goldgeier, 2004, p. 
26). Furthermore, they suggest that trans-sovereign nationalism advocates that political 
organisation across the border could be created by the centre, which is kin-state. Since it is not 
so common to engage in territorial changes today or to promote the repatriation of ethnic 
Hungarians, it is more realistic for the centre to create institutions and actively maintain the 
ethnic kin across the border. This is a strategy that has been adopted by Budapest. Also, it is 
important to emphasise that a certain form of repatriation exists and this research will try to 
look at it. Myra A. Waterbury writes about it, labelling it as a new policy that emerged, which 
focuses on the rights of ethnic kin and institutionalisation of their ties with the political centre 
via granting the citizenship (Waterbury, 2009). 
 Pogonyi, who writes about the transnational nationalism, describes the current 
Hungarian government’s strategy regarding the ethnic kin. Pogonyi says that transborder or 
transnational nationalism that follows the diaspora politics does not necessarily mean a return 
to the ideas of nationalism in which national and political borders should correspond. The 
author compares Orbán’s government rhetoric with revisionists’ or irredentists’ ideas of the 
                                                             
15 Irredentism, diaspora politics, minority rights and identity. Explained in subchapter 1.2.1 of this paper. 
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interwar period and argues that this centre-right government does not have such tendency, but 
rather keeps the pragmatism in inter-state relations. As an example, the author uses the case of 
certain Hungarian parties in Romania and Slovakia, which enjoy Hungary’s external support and 
because of that they became more demanding concerning the minority claims-making. 
However, this Hungarian government’s external support does not lead to any conflict or ethnic 
violence (Pogonyi, 2017).  
The fight for the interests of ethnic kin is closely related to the general politics of 
Orbán’s party. During the first mandate of Fidesz 1998-2002, there were the attempts to 
institutionalise relations to the ethnic kin, by passing the Status Law in 2001. This Law was 
followed by resentment from neighbouring countries and the EU institutions in general. While 
in 2010, when the Hungarian government supported dual citizenship, a serious reaction was 
missing16. Dual citizenship became the norm in most CEE countries by 2010, since the kin-states 
started using dual citizenship with non-resident voting rights as an instrument for nation-
building across the borders (Pogonyi, 2017). 
Pogonyi describes different cases when kin-state offers citizenship to ethnic kin. First 
one is in case of external minority protection. Another case is when the geopolitical 
considerations are the reason number one for reaching out to ethnic kin communities. The 
reasons for kin-states to institutionalise and formalize diaspora and transborder relations are 
due to potential economic benefits and what is even more important, gaining political support 
from the external population. Political parties of CEE that advocate kin-state support rely on 
diaspora votes and that their actions will pay off at the election. That is the reason behind the 
decision to offer voting rights as part of extraterritorial citizenship (Pogonyi, 2017, p. 30). 
Although the kin-states benefit politically, their engagement does not bring any economic 
benefits. The resources and funding that is addressed towards the Hungarian minorities are 
unidirectional, it is used mostly for maintaining the unique language and culture in 
neighbouring states, so there is not any direct economic return (Pogonyi, 2017, p. 112).  
                                                             
16 Except for Slovakia, where the new citizenship law was voted and required renunciation of Slovak citizenship if 
one applies for a second nationality. 
35 
 
The majority of ethnic Hungarians that live abroad eagerly welcomed the opportunity to 
gain dual citizenship, since they do feel part of the ethnocultural Hungarian nation. But, 
primarily the Hungarian passport serves as a getaway to the EU labour market (Pogonyi, 2019), 
and visa free entry to various Western countries, e.g. the USA. This is especially the case with 
the citizens from non-EU (Serbia, Ukraine) and non-Schengen countries (Romania). Numerous 
literature resources examine the question of Hungarian dual citizenship from 2010 onwards 
(Korhecz, 2011) (Pogonyi, 2011) (Waterbury, 2014) (Papp, 2017). Scholars point out that ethnic 
Hungarians see dual citizenship as an example of positive action and proof of responsibility of 
the kin-state towards the ethnic kin, as well as a sort of compensation for injustices from past 
and somewhat disadvantaged position that they enjoy in home states. 
Egedy writes about the transnational nationalism, by giving the concrete examples, such 
as one about the major change that occurred when Fidesz started to dominate Hungarian 
political life in 2010. The new initiative in nation-building that was suggested introduced a 
practice in which the Hungarian state from then on represents the interest of not only the 
Hungarians living in Hungary but also the ones that live outside17 (Egedy, 2015). This means that 
official Budapest took the responsibility for the fate and well-being of all ethnic Hungarians, no 
matter where they live. Egedy also points out that the reformulating of the kin-state policy was 
needed since Orbán’s government tried to move away from left-liberal and conservative 
approaches that were characteristic for Hungarian politics after the collapse of communism. 
The Fidesz government’s idea of kin-state policy seeks to place the concept of the Hungarian 
nation in the focus, by using the national identity to mobilize ethnic kin abroad to promote 
national goals and interests. But, this was not as easy, since a big part of Hungarian society in 
the country does not have a set attitude about the ethnic kin and the Hungarian identity in 
general (Egedy, 2013). 
Another interesting feature of Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, that is very 
important and that should be examined is related to the change in numbers of Hungarians 
                                                             




through the years. The Hungarian population is gradually decreasing since 1990 and the case of 
Vojvodina Hungarians is not an exception. Hungarian communities are somewhat disappointed 
over how little had been achieved regarding guaranteeing basic minority rights, so this research 
will try to look closer at the situation with Serbian Hungarians since little is known about their 
perspective. Ethnic Hungarians abroad today have their institutions that serve to represent 
their interest; they establish Hungarian political parties, media, church institutions, various 
cultural and civic organisations, etc. The situation with native language and education rights is 
better than it was until the 1990s and minorities take part in political life locally, regionally, and 
nationally in their home states. But, the level of protection and respect for minority rights differ 
from country to country. Many authors focus their works on Hungarians in Slovakia and 
Romania and less about Serbia and Ukraine (Veres, 2013) (Csergő & Goldgeier, 2013) (Iglesias, 
Sata, & Vass, 2016) (Skalnik Leff & Armeanu, 2017). Therefore, this research will try to get an 
overview of the situation in these Hungarian institutions abroad, regarding the respect of 
fundamental minority rights and general satisfaction with the status of Vojvodina Hungarians. 
 
2.2.1 Hungarian kin-state support until 2010 
The history of contemporary Hungarian kin-state support starts with changes that 
occurred in the region in the late 1980s-beginning of the 1990s. Hungarian political parties 
agreed on the need for kin-state to support the Hungarian institutions and unique culture 
abroad. The first task towards this was the establishment of an institution in Hungary that will 
deal with ethnic kin abroad - the Government Office for Hungarians Communities Abroad. This 
body was responsible for building a network of agencies, organisations and foundations that 
are important for preserving of Hungarian culture and language, improving education and 
economic levels and linking Hungarian minorities with Hungarian state (Csergő & Goldgeier, 
2001). Besides that, the first post-communist government in Hungary also established a public 
foundation18, responsible for financing the national minorities abroad; as well as the TV channel 
                                                             
18 Illyés Alapítvány 
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‘Duna’19, which operates in neighbouring countries by delivering programmes in the Hungarian 
language. These projects represent the first elements offered to ethnic kin as part of modern 
Hungarian kin-state support. 
In that period, the general opinion of the Hungarian elite was that the sort of autonomy 
for ethnic kin is necessary since it would ensure the sustainable, long-lasting survival of these 
communities in their historical lands. The aspirations of gaining autonomy might be supported 
by the kin-state, but most home states do not share the same opinion. Hungary started with 
the promotion of the rights of Hungarians across the border and developed strategies that 
supported their autonomy and collective language rights. However, the progress was not 
significant in the first period, so ethnic Hungarians abroad were unsatisfied and their number 
was declining (Wimmer, 2013). Already then, the political features of kin-state support started 
to emerge, since the redefinition of the nation was becoming one of the main principles that 
were used by elites to gain certain political points. Also, it served for the self-definition of 
political parties and the institutionalisation of the state on a national level (Bárdi, 2013). 
One of the events that are considered to be the turning point in early Hungarian kin-
state politics and that announced the direction of the new Hungarian government was the 1990 
speech of former Hungarian Prime Minister, József Antall. Following his victory in the first 
democratic elections in Hungary, he said that he became the Prime Minister of 15 million 
Hungarians20, “in spirit and sentiment”. This loud was met by the support of Hungarian political 
parties from opposite sides of the political spectrum (Egedy, 2013, p. 69). The new Hungarian 
government started the democratic era with the decision to actively engage in kin-state politics, 
by working hard on developing the strategy on how to improve the position of their co-patriots 
across the border. The protection of Hungarian minority rights represented one of the 
fundamental principles of Hungarian foreign policy. However, this matter was not anything new 
in Hungarian affairs. The 1949 Hungarian Constitution emphasises that: “The Republic of 
Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside its borders and 
                                                             
19 Meaning: Danube 
20 In 1990, Hungary had a population of approximately 10 million people, so it was obvious who does this refer to. 
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shall promote and foster their relations with Hungary” (Act XX of 1949 The Constitution of the 
Republic of Hungary). Years under communism did not work in favour of this stance, but in the 
last 30 years, the idea to keep all Hungarians close developed and reached new peaks. 
Those foundations of kin-state politics that were laid during the rule of Antall’s MDF also 
served to the Hungarian governments that came later. There were different approaches to kin-
state politics, but the most proactive steps were taken under the rule of Fidesz (1998-2002; 
2010-current). Orbán’s attitudes towards Hungarians abroad turned to be very similar to 
Antall’s, and he repeated his famous words, by saying that Hungary’s future lies not only in 10 
million Hungarians from Hungary but in 15 million Hungarians no matter where they live. The 
politics towards the ethnic kin became a central feature of Orbán’s policy, so his government 
was actively working on strategies to improve the relations and offer wider support. According 
to Orbán, the Hungarians abroad did not represent a burden, but an important and politically 
very valuable matter (Bárdi, 2004). 
During the first four years in power, Orbán’s government managed to realise two 
milestones of the Hungarian kin-state politics: the establishment of MÁÉRT21 - institutional 
forum of dialogue between the state of Hungary and Hungarians abroad; and the adoption of 
the Hungarian Status Law (Kovács E. , 2020). 
The first step towards the institutionalisation of kin-state politics was the establishment 
of MÁÉRT - the Hungarian Standing Conference. The main role of this platform was to serve as 
the consultation forum between Hungarian state (Hungarian Parliamentarians and Ministers) 
and minority Hungarian representatives (organisations that have parliamentary or provincial 
representation in their home countries), respectively between Hungarian politicians from both 
sides of the border. Since 1999, MÁÉRT Conference was held once a year and the main issues of 
ethnic Hungarian communities were discussed (Kántor, 2014).  
Besides establishing the Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT), another novelty of 
the Orbán’s government first term was the adoption of Hungarian Status Law. Act LXII of 2001 
                                                             
21 Magyar Állandó Értekezlet - the Hungarian Standing Conference. 
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on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries or known in the literature as the Hungarian 
Status Law is not a unique practice that exists only in Hungary. The phenomenon of Status laws 
is very common in the CEE region22. It is called ‘Status’ law because it serves to manage and 
improve the status of ethnic kin abroad. Such laws are usually classified as patriot or benefit 
laws since they grant a wide range of benefits for co-patriots across the border. One of the 
most valuable benefits that were offered through Status Law was the Hungarian identity card - 
a certificate that served as a proof of the ethnic belonging (Küpper, 2006). This means that 
Hungarians from Romania, Yugoslavia23, and Ukraine would be able to travel to Hungary 
without a visa. The purpose of this was the maintenance of cross-border ties of Hungary with 
Hungarians abroad also after the former joins the EU. 
The Status Law’s core benefit, the Hungarian identity card, provided Hungarians from 
neighbouring countries with a wide range of opportunities, such as education grants, work 
permits, access to health care and social security, etc. They could technically apply for the same 
state benefits as Hungarians from Hungary (Tóth, 2003). As part of Budapest’s nation-building 
project, the ethnic Hungarians could also receive educational benefits if studying in their home 
state. According to Bárdi and Misovicz, the aim of this was to ensure that Hungarian ethnic 
communities are aware of their ‘national’ identity and that they will promote their native 
language and culture in their homes states (Kántor, 2006). 
The Hungarian Status Law represented another step towards the institutionalisation of 
the relations of Budapest and its ethnic kin. Also, it served as a tool to expand the Hungarian 
political community and strengthen the ties with the external voters. The occurrence of 
Hungarian Status Law in Hungarian foreign policy was specific because it evoked negative 
reactions of Hungarian neighbours, mostly Slovakia and Romania. One of the reasons for such 
reaction was the fact that this law was supposed to apply explicitly to Hungarians that live in 
neighbouring countries, and not the ethnic diaspora living in the West. Hungarian neighbours 
were concerned that such controversial law will worsen their bilateral relations and that such 
                                                             
22 Before Hungary, Slovakia and Romania adopted their own versions of Status laws in 1997 and 1998 respectively. 
23 Federal Republic of; the name Yugoslavia was kept until 2003, when it was renamed to Serbia and Montenegro. 
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politics could shake other state’s sovereignty, so they called for the international reaction  
(Nagy, 2007). The same year, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe started 
investigating if this law is compatible with the international and most importantly European 
norms since Hungary was in the process of joining the EU. This was the first time that a 
European institution engaged in the investigation of already existing kin-state legislations at the 
European continent. 
The Venice Commission’s involvement resulted in the creation of general ‘European 
norms’ regarding the legitimacy and limitations of kin-state activism, which were presented in 
the form of a series of recommendations. They, inter alia, recommended following principles: 
“...the possibility for States to adopt unilateral measures on the protection of their kin-
minorities, irrespective of whether they live in neighbouring or in other countries, is conditional 
upon the respect of the following principles: a) the territorial sovereignty of States; b) pacta sunt 
servanda; c) friendly relations amongst States, and d) the respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, in particular the prohibition of discrimination” (The protection of 
national minorities by their kin-state, 2002). 
The CoE Commission also investigated previous Hungarian kin-state practices. The 
Commission discouraged the creation and the appointment of institutions in other countries, 
which would act instead of kin-state. The decisions about it need to be made bilaterally (Weber, 
2004). Taking into account the limitations received, the new Hungarian government developed 
the adjusted version of Status Law in 2003. However, this was just temporary and de jure, since 
it did not manage to decrease the support of kin-state activism that was present among the 
Hungarian elite. Orbán’s Fidesz, that became the opposition party following the 2002 elections, 
was among the ‘loudest’ ones in the campaign for wider kin-state support, nonetheless (Udrea, 
2014). 
The Hungarian identity card that was introduced by Hungarian Status Law was a 
forerunner of Hungarian ‘dual citizenship’ law, which was suggested already in 1996 and 
became a political goal by 1998. The main setback for adopting this law earlier was the lack of 
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support within Fidesz’s political opponents24 and what was later proved also among the 
Hungarian public during the 2004 referendum on dual citizenship25. One of the reasons for such 
poor support might lie in the fact that after many years under the communism26, Hungarian 
public was lacking knowledge and interest about the ethnic kin and what would dual citizenship 
mean to them. Kovács suggests also other, even more important reasons, such as the fear that 
Hungarians coming from countries with the poorer economy will come and occupy their jobs or 
that the reform will cost Hungary a lot. Most of these arguments come from governing, socialist 
and liberal parties, who campaigned against the dual citizenship law (Kovács M., 2006). 
One of the main arguments that socialist party used in their campaign was that 
Hungarians in Hungary should not allow ethnic Hungarians who do not work and live in 
Hungary, thus do not pay taxes to be able to have a say in Hungarian internal politics. By gaining 
citizenship, ethnic Hungarians would also be granted a right to vote in Hungarian parliamentary 
elections. This was a number one concern of then-governing political parties since they were 
aware of the fact that by gaining non-resident voting rights, ethnic Hungarians abroad would 
mostly vote for conservative parties27 who proposed the dual citizenship in the first place. It is 
clear that the political stakes at that point were high and that political parties were aware of 
who would benefit the most from dual citizenship law (Waterbury, 2010). 
The 2004 referendum showed that Hungarian political parties have different attitudes 
regarding the level of kin-state support that they are ready to offer to Hungarians abroad, so 
the certain polarisation of the approach towards the Hungarian kin-minority occurred. Due to 
the failure of Fidesz’s proposal on dual citizenship, another legislation of Orbán’s 1998-2002 
government was revoked - the Hungarian Standing Conference. The MÁÉRT has not convened 
again because the relations between the then-current Hungarian government and Hungarians 
abroad got complicated. Until 2010, the Hungarian kin-state activism was very limited and in 
                                                             
24 The two-third majority in the Parliament was needed for adopting a law on dual citizenship. 
25 Slightly more than a half (51.57%) of voters voted in favour of the dual citizenship law, but the turnout was very 
low (37.67%). Hence, the referendum was considered to be invalid (Kovács M., 2006).  
26 The period when Hungarians were not even aware of large number of their co-patriots living in neighbouring 
countries. 
27 Primarily Fidesz. 
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the background. The only co-operation that was still active was the economic one, within the 
EU cross-border regional fund framework. 
 
2.2.2 Hungarian kin-state support after 2010 
The year 2010 represents the beginning of a new era in Hungarian internal and external 
politics. The conservative party Fidesz secured a landslide victory in 2010 parliamentary 
elections and after 8 years again became a governing party. Fidesz is seen as a centre-right 
fraction, so it is not a surprise that nationalism in 2010 onwards is the prime principle of 
Hungarian geopolitics and economic development framework. This political change gave new 
life to the Hungarian kin-state politics and Fidesz continued where it was stopped two political 
circles ago. Although the referendum on dual citizenship failed, Orbán’s government knew how 
important it is for its political stability to commit to introducing non-resident citizenship 
promptly. 
Three months after the elections, the first legislative act of the new government was 
passed. The amendment suggested was related to the Hungarian Law on Citizenship, so the 
Hungarian kin-state politics were back into the centre of Hungarian external politics. Starting 
January 2011, non-resident Hungarians abroad were able to request the Hungarian citizenship, 
without having the permanent residence in Hungary. The new amendments make the whole 
process simpler and it minimised the requirements. To become a Hungarian citizen, a person 
needs to meet two major criteria: a) prove the Hungarian ancestry and; b) have a basic 
command of the Hungarian language. Due to the simplicity of requirements, the whole process 
is very open to abuse.  
Firstly, to prove the Hungarian ancestry, an applicant must provide the evidence of 
being related to the ancestor who was Hungarian or lived on the territory of former Hungary28; 
and can prove it by death or birth certificates. Since former Hungary used to cover a significant 
                                                             
28 Which include also Kingdom of Hungary and Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
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territory and was very multiethnic, the geography and ethnicity of possible applicants got 
wider. Secondly, the language requirement is very vague, since it states that one needs to 
‘know the language’. Also, there is no exam or the list of questions that the applicant needs to 
prepare. The level of applicant’s language knowledge is assessed by usually very busy clerks 
during a brief meeting29 (Pogonyi, 2013). 
For the applicants from non-EU countries as Ukraine and Serbia, having Hungarian 
citizenship can be life-changing. Being a Hungarian citizen means having EU citizenship, thanks 
to which one would be able to work, move freely, and enjoy all other opportunities within the 
EU. Also, many Serbians for instance, who do not necessarily have anything in common with 
Hungarian ethnos, but can easily ‘find’ an ancestor who lived in Austro-Hungary, realised that 
this citizenship law can be abused and saw it as an opportunity to gain the EU citizenship. This 
increased demand for Hungarian lessons in Serbia since 2011. In the last couple of years, the 
Hungarian government identified this abuse, so it raised the level of language requirement and 
now a solid Hungarian is required (‘Sve teže do mađarskog državljanstva’, 2016). 
The amendment of dual citizenship was followed by the amendment of the electoral law 
shortly. So, another benefit of kin-state support was introduced, which is voting rights to non-
resident citizens. Fidesz’s government certainly had a great interest in introducing these 
amendments and there was not almost any public debate or the involvement of the opposition 
(Bozoki, 2013). Besides gaining the potential voters among ‘new’ Hungarian citizens, it also 
helped in creating the general national image of this political party and it attracted new 
domestic voters, who sympathise with ethnic Hungarian communities abroad (Waterbury, 
2017). The new Hungarian external policy, by December 2017, led to already one million ethnic 
Hungarians, who exercised their right and gained dual citizenship (‘Hungary grants its millionth 
Hungarian citizenship’, 2017). Judging by the latest elections in which Fidesz participated, i. e. 
the elections for European Parliament in 2019, it is obvious that Orbán’s government chose the 
right path. An absolute majority, or 96% of non-EU Hungarian non-resident citizens who had 
voted, cast their votes in favour of Fidesz (‘Hungarians outside EU cast votes for Fidesz’, 2019). 
                                                             
29 The situation changed a bit in last couple of years, so now a solid knowledge of Hungarian is required. 
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The reaction on such wide Hungarian kin-state politics is nevertheless missing from the 
EU. Batory noticed that the EU and CoE reacted in 2001 when the Status Law introduced the 
extraterritorial benefits to Hungarian ethnic kin, but they did not do the same in 2010 when the 
idea of dual citizenship re-emerged (Batory, 2010). The reason for the missing reaction can be 
found in Pogonyi’s argument that dual citizenship already became the norm in many European 
countries by that time, since they needed migrants to meet labour market shortages, especially 
the ones who can be well integrated into European societies (Pogonyi, 2017).  
Along with the amendments mentioned above, Orbán’s government introduced also 
other measures that are part of the kin-state support. The Hungarian kin-state politics got their 
governmental institution, within the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. The State 
Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad was constituted and its main function is to be in 
charge of kin-state policy. In 2010 the MÁÉRT Conference was reactivated and already next 
year it adopted the Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad. This framework 
became the first comprehensive document of Hungarian kin-state policy. Clear definitions of 
the Hungarian government strategy regarding the Hungarian communities abroad can be found 
in this document (Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad, 2011). 
Concerning the financial part of kin-state support, the Bethlen Gábor Fund was 
established and it replaced all previous foundations that existed. Today, this organisation 
represents the major public body that deals with funds for Hungarian ethnic kin’s organisations, 
institutions, and individuals. The fund for financing the projects of Hungarians abroad is 
constantly increasing since 2010 (Kovács E., 2020). In 2015, the Hungarian government came up 
with the ‘50 billion HUF Plan’30. This 5-year-plan fund is intended for the economic 
development of Vojvodina, support of farm export, and granting money (‘Hungary to launch 
HUF 50 bln program in Serbia’, 2015). 
The kin-state activism is a very complex phenomenon since there are many types of 
support and there are various interests behind it. The example of Hungary shows how far this 
                                                             
30 Approximately 143.6 million EUR. 
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support can go that sometimes it directly or indirectly intervenes in the internal affairs of 
neighbouring countries. Kin-state wants the best for its ethnic minorities abroad, so this 
sometimes also includes advocating for autonomy, establishing different institutions, and 
financing kin-minority’s activities. In return, the Hungarian government can expect the political 
support of ethnic kin through votes. Hungary invested a lot of effort and resources in its kin-
state politics, so it is clear why it is considered to be probably the most proactive kin-state in 
the CEE region.  
 
2.3 Political aspects of Hungarian kin-state activism 
The complexity of kin-state activism in Hungary also lies in the fact that its purpose is 
very multidimensional. Besides the generally accepted opinion that the main reason for active 
kin-state support is the moral sense of ethnic affiliation and restoration of national identity; the 
probably main intention of kin-state’s political elite is primarily oriented around political and to 
a certain extent, economical interests. Nevertheless, the common ethnic belonging and 
national feeling still represent an inseparable and crucial element of kin-state politics 
foundation and serve as a foreground behind which other interests can be realised. 
Myra A. Waterbury argues that the political and strategic purpose of kin-state politics is 
the reason why kin-states are so engaged in keeping their ethnic kin as close as possible. She 
suggests that political elites of kin-state are driven by three sets of resources that ethnic kin can 
bring: a) ‘material’ for economic interests; b) ‘culturo-linguistic’ for nation-building interests 
and; c) ‘political’ which bring power to kin-state elites (Waterbury, 2010). All three, more or 
less, can be applied to Hungarian kin-state politics, but the latter two are more dominant than 
the former one.  
The material resources are more typical for kin-states whose diaspora work in 
economically more developed countries and their economy benefits a lot from investments and 
remittances that they send back to their family back home. Also, it is common for diaspora 
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communities to offer an external market for kin-state’s export. As mentioned before, Hungary 
does not get any direct economic return from minority communities (Pogonyi, 2017). However, 
the Hungarian case is interesting, since the justification for kin-state activities also includes the 
promises of economic gains from ethnic kin communities in the future, e.g. as a pool of labour 
(Melegh, 2003). 
Regarding the culturo-linguistic set of resources, the main interest is the strategic one. 
The ethnic kin communities preserve the language, culture, and national identity on the 
territories that used to be controlled by the kin-state. Therefore, they play an important role in 
the nation-building process. Hungarian state generously financially supports the projects that 
promote the Hungarian language and culture. The possible threats to these communities, such 
as assimilation or emigration, are seen very negatively from the kin-state’s perspective since 
they jeopardise the ethnic kin survival on historical lands. Another feature of this type of 
correlation is that ethnic kin can be used as a proof of national myths, which further can justify 
the nationalism, as part of the state policy (Barkey, 2000). This is common for Fidesz, which is 
seen from its voters as a saviour of the nation who grants non-resident citizenship, preserves 
the language and culture, and calls for autonomy as part of its kin-state politics. In this way, 
Fidesz somewise corrects the historical injustices in the eyes of its voters and kin abroad. 
Finally, the most controversial resource that a kin-state can gain from its ethnic kin is 
the political one. In the Hungarian case, already in the late 1970s, the right-wing fractions 
started the promotion of more active kin-state involvement, as part of political strategy. After 
the regime change, in the late 1980s, when the Alliance of Young Democrats31 (Fidesz) was 
established, the engagement with ethnic kin across the border was set as an essential political 
course of the party (Waterbury, 2006). Until the middle of the 1990s, Fidesz could be rather 
defined as a liberal party, opposing the right-wing government. This early start later provided 
Fidesz with an important advantage in political competition, when the support from Hungarians 
abroad started to rise. This is especially the case after the country joined the EU and by default, 
the value of Hungarian citizenship got sufficiently higher. 
                                                             
31 Changed in 1995 to Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party, and then in 2003 to Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance. 
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To reach the point when ethnic kin abroad starts to bring the political benefit, right-wing 
parties had to focus first on the promotion of culturo-linguistic aspects. From the beginning, the 
ties with ethnic kin were built on loyalty. Parties that had strong nationalist rhetoric were 
promising to protect the rights of ethnic kin abroad and tried to present themselves as the main 
protectors of the Hungarian nation. This can be said especially for the period after the middle of 
the 1990s, when the socialist-liberal government signed basic treaties with Slovakia and 
Romania, which was criticized by Fidesz, being on its shift from liberal to right-wing positions 
(Lanczi, 2005). Fidesz managed to preserve the ethnic kin’s loyalty, so this opened the door for 
the development of kin-state activism to such a level, when it was possible to advocate and 
later adopt the non-resident voting rights. 
Keeping the ethnic kin connected to the kin-state requires a lot of effort and continuity. 
It is very important for the kin-state to constantly remind the kin-minority that they matter, by 
introducing new privileges and benefits. Fidesz did exactly that during its first and the latest two 
terms, and it still engages actively by constantly raising the funds for support and advocating for 
the autonomy of Hungarians in neighbouring countries. Thinking long term, the successful kin-
state politics depend on the capability of kin-state to balance between its interest and desire to 
be in control of kin-state - kin-minority relations and consideration of the needs of the ethnic 
kin communities (Waterbury, 2020). This research’s task is exactly that - analysing different 
aspects of Hungarian kin-state politics, with all its features above and under the surface; and 
comparing it with Vojvodina Hungarians’ expectations, needs, and issues. Only after considering 
both sides of kin-state-support-medal, the conclusions on actual reality will be possible. 
 
2.4 Hungarian kin-minorities 
Approximately 2.1 million32 ethnic Hungarians enjoy the status of a kin-minority. 
Hungarians mostly live in Romania (1.2 million), Slovakia (450.000), Serbia (250.000), and 
Ukraine (150.000) and represent the main subject of Hungarian kin-state politics. Two main 
                                                             
32 According to 2011 population censuses held in Romania, Slovakia and Serbia; and 2001 census in Ukraine. 
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features of ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries are: a) they have a strong feeling of 
Hungarian national identity and; b) their number and percentage is significantly decreasing. 
These features are mostly shaped by the activities related to Hungarian kin-state support and 
some other general trends in the region. 
 The authors as Nándor Bárdi prefer to use the term ‘Hungarian minority communities’ 
when speaking of ethnic Hungarians abroad, due to their strong Hungarian affiliation. Despite 
the common language, ethnicity, and culture, these Hungarian communities also took part in 
the Hungarian nation-building process before the collapse of Austro-Hungary (Bárdi, 2013). 
Another reason, for such a strong feeling of Hungarian national identity that is linked to the 
previous one, can be found in Schöpflin’s works. He argues that these communities stick to 
their primary cultural and political aspiration to remain Hungarian, thanks to a very close 
relationship with their kin-state. Additionally, the fact that ethnic Hungarian communities took 
part in Hungarian nation-building and not one of their home states makes their Hungarian 
national affiliation inseparable part of their national identity (Schöpflin, 2006). Pogonyi, 
suggests that most ethnic Hungarians consider that their Hungarian national identity is 
somewhat stronger than the one from Hungarians in Hungary. The argument is that ethnic 
Hungarians are confronted with their nationality daily, e. g. when using their mother tongue in 
communities where another, the majority language is more dominated (Pogonyi, 2017). 
Geopolitical changes caused by the outcomes of World War I made ethnic Hungarians a 
national minority in their current home states. This has put them in an inferior position 
compared to the majority population, so the fight for wider rights is constantly on their political 
agenda. Taking into account their kin-states’ nationalist affinities, it is not a surprise that kin-
minorities are striving for the institutionalisation of their status in the form of self-government 
or autonomy within the home state. It is obvious, that the higher is level of autonomy, the 
higher is the level of their social and political organisation. Hungarian neighbours have different 
approaches and opinions on the level of the autonomy that should be allowed to their 
Hungarian minorities. None of the countries is willing to provide national, territorial 
autonomies, but offer some other forms of protection instead. Hungary as a kin-state is a 
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significant player in these debates and it is clear that without its participation, Hungarian 
minorities would not be able to maintain already existing systems of minority institutions, 
primarily financially (Bárdi, 2004). 
In 2011, the Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad labelled the 
survival of ethnic Hungarian communities as one of the main principles of kin-state politics. An 
explanation of the Hungarian government’s position regarding the relation between Hungarian 
minority and their home state was given and it praised the current situation in Serbia: “Similarly 
to the titular nations, national minorities strive to preserve their identities and ensure the 
prosperity of their communities. No national minority – including Hungarians – assimilates 
voluntarily. Hungarians living in neighbouring countries experience various (explicit or implicit) 
disadvantages compared to majority communities. The state shall not differentiate between 
citizens based on their national belongings. Citizens’ equal rights are not fully guaranteed if 
equality is not ensured at the level of minority nationalities. After the breakdown of the 
communist system, Hungarian minorities established interest representation organisations and 
political parties, which formulated demands regarding minority rights, autonomy, and 
unhindered relations with Hungary. Progress has been achieved in comparison to the pre-1989 
situation, but institutions essential for the growth and reproduction of Hungarian communities 
have not been established. The main political objectives of national communities are on the one 
hand territorial autonomy and the creation of smaller, self-governing units within the state, and 
on the other hand the foundation of independent institutions. In this area, progress has only 
been made in Vojvodina (Serbia), where in 2010 the Hungarian National Council - the political 
body of Hungarian cultural autonomy – was established through direct and democratic 
elections” (Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad, 2011). This position makes 
sense, bearing in mind the Fidesz’s political stances. The case of Vojvodina shows that some of 
the Hungarian neighbours are ready to discuss these issues and take concrete actions regarding 
the improvement of Hungarian minority status. 
Another important matter that follows the Hungarian kin-minority is the outlook of their 
future/their survival within the home state. The data shows that the number of Hungarians in 
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neighbouring countries is constantly dropping and the reasons for it are specific for every 
country. Besides some of the general trends as that the population is generally getting older, 
other common trends are the assimilation, when offspring from mixed marriages usually adopt 
the identity of a ‘majority’ parent; or due to the war, especially common in the Balkans (Bárdi, 
2013). However, the economic migration to Hungary and further ‘West’ represents the major 
reason (Gödri, 2015). Hungary is economically significantly more developed than many 
neighbours and it is also an EU country, so wide Hungarian kin-state support has a major 
influence on the drop in the number of minority Hungarians. Hungarians do emigrate from their 
historical lands and the dual citizenship law opened the doors for that. After adding their home 
state’s passivity to engage more proactively in the autonomy projects33, it is more than obvious 
that the decision to migrate is not as difficult to be taken. 
To stop the emigration of ethnic Hungarians, Budapest came with different strategic 
plans, regarding the improvement of the economic status of its ethnic kin, since the economic 
migration is the main reason for the emigration. The goal of these plans is to create more job 
opportunities and improve the standards of living, by for instance investing in tourism of the 
areas where kin-minority lives (‘Vlada Mađarske brine o sunarodnicima u Srbiji: Vojvođanskim 
Mađarima za razvoj turizama 20 miliona evra’, 2019) or supporting Hungarian small and 
medium-sized enterprises (‘Mađarska pomaže vojvođanske Mađare’, 2016). Also, they focus on 
institutional development through various educational and business programmes. Since these 
funds are allocated either by Budapest or by certain minority actors, parties, party-related 
agencies, etc., they also serve as some kind of an electoral mobilization. 
 
2.4.1 Hungarians in Vojvodina 
Hungarians in Serbia represent the country’s biggest and most compact minority group 
(excluding Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija, who boycotted the census), with a population 
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of 253,899 people or 3.5% of the country, according to the 2011 Census. The vast majority of 
ethnic Hungarians (251,136 people) live in the Serbian Autonomous Province of Vojvodina 
where they represent 13% of the total province’s population (Bárdi, 2013). Hungarians form an 
absolute/relative majority in eight out of 45 Vojvodina municipalities. The multicultural city of 
Subotica in the very north of the country is considered to be the main cultural and political 
centre of Serbian Hungarians. 
Since late 2000, when democrats came to power in Serbia, the country is on its way 
towards becoming an EU member; and achieving the general state of democracy. To become a 
modern, European state, Serbia must prove its willingness to deal with human rights issues. 
Being particularly ethnically and culturally diverse, with 23 officially registered minority 
groups34; one of the essential efforts that the Serbian government is required to take is related 
to actively encouraging the political participation of these minority communities and the 
general preservation of their culture and language. This aspect of minority politics is key for 
cultural reproduction and the survival of the community in general (Kapitány, 2015). The 
Hungarian language is one the official languages of Vojvodina province35, therefore, the 
Hungarians have a right to be taught in their mother tongue36, use it in public, administration, 
education, etc. 
As mentioned in the Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad, Serbia is 
the only Hungarian neighbour37 which grants its Hungarian minority with cultural non-territorial 
autonomy and group rights. In 2002, Yugoslav38 Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of 
National Minorities introduced the National Minority Council, an institution through which 
every registered national minority can exercise its cultural autonomy (Korhecz, 2014). The 
funding for the National Minority Council activities is provided from the national, regional, and 
local budgets of the Republic of Serbia. Also, the activities can be financed by donations and 
other income, which technically can (and does) include funds from a kin-state. 
                                                             
34 Most of the minority groups live in Vojvodina. 
35 In 31 out of 45 Vojvodina municipalities. 
36 Primary, Secondary and Tertiary education. 
37 Along with Croatia and Slovenia, who have significantly less Hungarians. 
38 Until 2003 the country was called FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and (today’s Serbia and Montenegro). 
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Article 1a of Serbian Law on National Councils of National Minorities from 2009 
describes National Minority Council as “an organisation legally entrusted certain public 
competences to participate in decision making or to independently make decision about certain 
issues in the area of culture, education, information, and official use of languages and scripts in 
order to achieve the collective right of a national minority to self-government in those areas” 
(The Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government of the Republic of Serbia, 
2009). Every four years, the members of National Minority Councils are elected, through direct 
elections. For Hungarian National Council, a total of 35 members are elected, suggested by 
Hungarian political parties’ lists. The general practice is that party lists, besides politicians, also 
include non-political individuals - usually prominent members of civil organisations, church, or 
intelligentsia. 
Hungarians in Serbia actively participate in political life locally, regionally, and nationally. 
So, one of the characteristics of HNC is that it serves as a platform for different political 
interests and influences as well. The main Hungarian minority parties in Serbia are VMSZ 
(Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians), VMDK (Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians), 
and VMDP (Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians) (Hagan Darin, 2009). The convincingly 
most dominant party out of three is VMSZ (Herner-Kovács, Illyés, & Rákóczi, 2015). The party 
enjoys big support from the ruling Serbian majority party - SNS. Because of that, it is usually 
accused by its opponents of having a special, privileged status. Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 
is also the only party that regularly participates in general Serbian state elections and every 
year records better and better results. In the last couple of convocation of the Serbian 
assembly, Hungarians normally occupied four to six out of 250 seats, as part of a special 
minority quota. While at the latest elections, held in June 2020, the VMSZ managed to get 
‘historical’ nine seats (Ivković, 2020). Just for comparison, the third most popular Serbian 
national party at the moment, the Serbian Patriotic Alliance, won 11 seats, so Hungarians are 
technically the fourth-strongest party on a national level in the Serbian Parliament. The reason 
for this can be found in their voiced support of the SNS and Fidesz politics. Almost certainly, 
VMSZ will be part of the new Serbian government as well and can expect to be highly placed, 
due to, among other things, their loyalty to SNS. The VMSZ serves as a sort of a link between 
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Hungarian and Serbian leading political parties. Fidesz and SNS and their leaders Orbán and 
Vučić have a very good political and economic co-operation in the last couple of years. 
Therefore, those Hungarian voters who support SNS and VMSZ in Serbia also support Fidesz, 
which was seen in the 2018 parliamentary elections (Trivić, 2018) as well as the 2019 EP 
elections (Cseresnyés, 2019). 
As in other countries in a Hungarian neighbourhood, the Hungarian minority in Serbia is 
in decline. In the last 50 years, every census there were around 40-50,000 Hungarians less 
(Stjepanović, 2018). Since the last census was held in 2011, the same year when the Hungarian 
dual citizenship law was introduced, the expected numbers of Hungarians in next year's census 
are discouraging (Keller-Alánt, 2020). According to VMSZ leader, István Pásztor, today, almost 
every Hungarian in Serbia already obtained a Hungarian passport (‘Pastor: Gotovo svi Mađari u 
Vojvodini imaju dva državljanstva’, 2020). This passport does not have a symbolic purpose only, 
but also, more importantly, takes Serbian Hungarians to the EU, gives them access to the labour 
market, and free movement within. Thus, the benefits of Hungarian kin-state support in Serbia 
are obvious. And, more importantly for Hungarian Fidesz, their kin-state support brings the 
desired results and political benefits in return. 
In the chapter that follows, all of the specifics of kin-state support in Serbia, as well as 







Chapter 3 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
3.1 Findings 
 The interviews with the representatives of Vojvodina Hungarian minority were essential 
for creating an image of the actual state of affairs and issues that this community faces. The 
Hungarians in Vojvodina are a very compact and well-organised community and they manage to 
keep good ties with both the Serbian and the Hungarian state. Having a status of minority puts 
them in a position where they can benefit from both sides. These benefits are followed by 
different interests that can cause problems for the community in general. The analysis of 
primary data allowed the identification and clustering of Vojvodina Hungarians’ issues. The 
main themes of Hungarian minority issues could be grouped as follows: 
A) The issues of Hungarian autonomy. Serbian state provided Hungarians with the 
cultural autonomy and institutionalised it by creating the Hungarian National Council. 
Nevertheless, some of the issues remain and they are usually connected with the passivity or 
hidden interests of the Serbian side, which is exposed through law changes. 
B) Political interests. The Hungarian political life in Vojvodina has a rich history however 
the political parties are more and more polarised. One of them has been more dominant than 
the others and it is supported by leading Hungarian and Serbian national parties, Fidesz and 
SNS. The support is not only political, but it is also financial and it leaves people from the other 
side of the political spectrum very unsatisfied. 
C) General problems. Being a member of a minority group, one needs to face certain 
problems that the majority does not even think about, such as problems of use of language. 
Having a unique mother tongue and not knowing/not being able to learn the majority language 
well, creates the issues in minority education and later the employability in the home country.  
D) Emigration. Various causes lead to increasing minority emigration. The most evident 
ones are the poorer economy of the home state, the power of benefits offered by the kin-state, 
and others related to the lack of respect for minority rights. 
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3.1.1 Hungarian autonomy 
 Hungary as a kin-state promotes the idea that neighbouring countries with a significant 
Hungarian population should provide them with the wider autonomy and praises the case of 
Vojvodina. SERB-1.1.1 confirms that the Vojvodina case is successful: “Out of all the Hungarian 
communities in the Carpathian Basin (out with Hungary), the Vojvodina Hungarians were the 
first ones who defined the concept of autonomy, which contributed a lot to Serbia’s unique 
success in the realization of personal and cultural autonomy”39. 
Although the general public in Serbia, due to the negative experience with Kosovo 
Albanians, is afraid that Hungarians could more actively fight for the territorial autonomy of 
Vojvodina Province, it seems that Vojvodina Hungarians do not think the same way and that is 
too late for that: “Well, we don’t think it would be realistic as the number of the Vojvodina 
Hungarians has decreased dramatically that we could not make it work today”40. So, the 
establishment of HNC was welcomed by everyone and it represents the main institution of 
Hungarian autonomy in Serbia. Many interviewees are aware of its significance: “We also think, 
that the HNC is not a goal but a device of the Hungarians to have a say in political matters (with 
the help of the representatives) on state-wide, provincial and regional levels. The Hungarian 
National Council aims for the conservation and the improvement of Hungarian identity and 
culture”41. Nevertheless, the HNC also has flaws and Vojvodina Hungarian representatives 
mentioned them. One of the representatives of the HNC, who insists on calling Vojvodina “The 
Southern Land”, considers that the law on national councils is not good enough and that the 
Serbian side is responsible: “The law itself is bleeding from many wounds. I believe that Serbia is 
a ‘shop window country’ which has always managed to show to the world how well they treat 
the minorities. Which is obviously not true at all”42. 
Many of the complaints about the HNC are related to its Act and certain modifications 
that occurred in 2014 and diminished some of the previous rights: “Our main issue related to 
                                                             
39 SERB-1.1.1, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
40 SERB-1.3.1, Interview with political party representative, Temerin, 18 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
41 SERB-1.1.1, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
42 SERB-2.1.4, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 16 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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the legal rights of the national council is that the HNC only has opinionizing rights; they can only 
practice the right for veto in certain cases; furthermore, they don’t or hard[l]y have any decision 
making rights”43. Also: “We think that one of our main task (and the common point we all 
share) is to modify the law on the national councils. The Serbian Constitutional Court has 
overruled certain regulations, also re-established others; while the law on the national councils 
isn’t in harmony with other laws. These matters need to be settled”44. Or as the Vojvodina 
provincial official describes it: “I think the constitutional court was very wrong. If the state says 
you can establish minority councils, then let them have some decision making rights...We have a 
beautiful council system but we cannot do anything with it”45. 
 Another issue that Hungarians face is related to Serbia’s legal approach to dealing with 
one’s ethnicity as part of the national minority definition. Vojvodina Hungarians do not know 
how many of them are there since the declaration of one’s ethnicity is voluntary: “As a start, 
the law on national councils should be rewritten now. It must be decided who can be called 
Hungarian. We proposed to take the electoral registry as a fundamental document which helps 
to estimate the real number of Hungarians living here”46. But, the reason for missing such 
registry was also explained: “According to the modern principles of the human rights, no one 
has the right to know someone else’s ethnicity, mainly not the state. This is the adequate format 
to follow; this is the definition for minority identity in Western Europe, in the western societies. 
The voluntary admission works in Serbia, only the personal manifestation can determinate who 
has what ethnicity”47. 
 According to some, the ideal law on national minorities, that could contribute to the 
general satisfaction of the minority communities and therefore keep them in Serbia, would 
regulate the question of proportional employment. However, the reason why this cannot be 
practised more actively is again due to the lack of an ethnicity registry:  “An ideal law would 
work for the Hungarian minority. I think most importantly it would include the proportional 
                                                             
43 SERB-1.3.1, Interview with political party representative, Temerin, 18 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
44 SERB-1.2.1, Interview with political party representative, Ada, 18 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
45 SERB-3.1.2, Interview with Vojvodina provincial official, Novi Sad, 13 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
46 SERB-2.1.4, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 16 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
47 SERB-2.1.3, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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employment. The proportional employment is a very big issue concerning the modern views. 
One’s ethnicity cannot be directly questioned - this is one of the problems - and the other one is 
that the ethnicity is a state of mind”48. The Vojvodina provincial official SERB-3.1.2 explains it: 
“Because here, no one recognises anyone, everyone has a right to declare themselves whatever 
they want to be... You can belong to any ethnic group, and it can be changed regularly… and of 
course it has advantages. But what are the disadvantages? Well, in such a frame, the 
affirmative actions cannot be practiced... It is impossible to check, and it would be a violation of 
human rights to judge someone due to the colour of their skin or the surnames of the 
parents”49. 
 While the complaints mostly come from people outside of the HNC, the representatives 
of this body see other problems, such as the funding: “Concerning the HNC and the national 
councils in general, I think that this is a very good system; however, in Serbia, the unity within 
the national councils seems to be very important alongside with the help of the mother country. 
The sum that is spent on the national councils are very small compare to what they need. If 
Hungary didn’t support Vojvodina’s programs and the execution of our goals, then it would be 
very difficult to succeed. Based on the jurisdiction, the national councils should only be receiving 
basic support from Serbia, just enough to cover the operational costs. I do not believe it is good. 
Without a doubt, the success depends on the strength of the national councils. And this is the 
reason why we have been successful”50.  
The direct financial support from the kin-state is common practice and it seems that the 
Serbian state does not have anything against it since it benefits from it: “...if we counted only 
the tax (so 20%) of the support we receive from Hungary, it would not even be as much as what 
the Serbian state provides us. So, obviously the support we receive from Hungary is spent here, 
in Serbia... On almost everything, the VAT is 20%... All the money we spend here in Serbia, its 
VAT obviously goes to the Serbian state budget. So, I am saying that the support we receive 
from the Serbian state is actually less than the 20% of what we spend. This is a very interesting 
                                                             
48 SERB-2.3.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bečej, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
49 SERB-3.1.2, Interview with Vojvodina provincial official, Novi Sad, 13 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
50 SERB-2.3.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bečej, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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fact; the Serbian government ends up having more money because of the support the HNC 
receives from the Hungarian state”51. 
 Taking into account everything that has been said previously, the general position of 
Hungarians in Serbia, no matter if they are Hungarian citizenship holders or not, can be 
described as: “It is difficult to say whether any Hungarians, who are also Serbia citizens, wake 
up with the thought of ‘how good it is to be here and to have the National Council’. However, if 
we forget about this demagogue aspect, the National Council has proved that people are 
benefiting from its actions... Now, it can be said being Hungarian in Serbia is an advantage 
(unlike in the last 90 or over 90 years)”52. 
 
3.1.2 Political issues  
As discussed earlier, the Hungarian kin-state politics consist of multiple political 
interests. One of the ways to maintain the ties with the ethnic kin is by supporting the 
Hungarian minority parties in neighbouring states, and that is exactly what Fidesz does in Serbia 
as well. Among the interviewees, members of different political parties can be found, and 
depending on their views towards Fidesz and Serbian SNS, the issues differ. The representative 
of VMSZ justifies the collaboration with Fidesz: “Meanwhile, it is also essential for the VMSZ to 
have a good collaboration with the Hungarian government in power, to make sure that our 
ideas receive support from them too. (Obviously, I can only talk in the name of VMSZ) we have a 
strategical collaboration with the current government, the FIDESZ (Hungarian Civic Alliance). 
There are many benefits of this collaboration... Certainly, the Hungarian National Council also 
benefits from this collaboration”53. Besides that, a strong relationship with Vučić's SNS is also 
very beneficial for the Hungarian community in general: “Also, Vojvodina Hungarians’ persistent 
political interest enabled the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ) consistent parliamentary 
representation, partial governing – due to obtained mandates -, the invention of the National 
                                                             
51 SERB-2.3.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bečej, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
52 SERB-1.1.1, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
53 SERB-1.1.1, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
59 
 
Councils, the Minority Framework Law, as well as the National Council Act. To achieve the 
above, the specimen of VMSZ successfully sought partners in the form of the Serbian political 
parties”54. This was indeed proved during the latest parliamentary elections in Serbia. 
However, the political opponents of VMSZ have some other concerns: “...the VMSZ has 
a very remarkable structure and is a well-supported organisation. As we have noticed, the 
definition of the public interests has become unifacial, so István Pásztor’s opinion is identified as 
the interests of Vojvodina Hungarians. What the VMSZ (István Pásztor) decides, that will be 
executed no matter what”55. Also, they are aware that the more divided they get, the closer will 
VMSZ get to SNS: “To be honest with you the more we disagreed with them the closer they got 
to the Serbian Progressive Party... Now, one of the border lines between the politics of the 
Serbian Progressive Party and the VMSZ is that the VMSZ is saying that without any doubt and 
without any requirements, only the Serbian Progressive Party can be the partner of the 
Hungarian community, and the only way is that if they take on governing role with the VMSZ”56. 
According to this, if a group of Hungarians who do not support the majority party SNS, wants to 
achieve something, they run into a problem. 
The political dominance and wide state support that VMSZ gets, leads to a polarisation 
of Vojvodina Hungarian political life also inside the HNC and puts the opposition in a very 
unfavourable position. The opposition parties’ representatives said that they do not receive any 
help from the Hungarian side: “...we never managed to receive[d] enough support, not from 
Budapest, nor from this country”57. While for the VMSZ and Fidesz, the opposition says: “Now, it 
is crystal clear, the VMSZ is the only partner of the Hungarian government. They don’t even 
want to acknowledge the other organisations”58 and “Well, when I said the Hungarian 
government supports parties, I did not mean that they are putting money into their pockets 
but…I don’t actually know how this support works. When we talk about support, I meant 
institutional, and political support. And for that institutional system that the Hungarians have in 
                                                             
54 SERB-1.1.1, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
55 SERB-2.1.3, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
56 SERB-1.1.2, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 17 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
57 SERB-1.2.1, Interview with political party representative, Ada, 18 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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Vojvodina, for example the financial support system that has just been launched…this practically 
was trusted with the VMSZ. This is how I mean the support of the Hungarian government”59. 
The fact is that the VMSZ enjoys the biggest support among Serbian Hungarians and 
represents the majority in HNC, after the 2018 elections60; so it is not a surprise that the kin-
state sees VMSZ as its closest ally and trustee. The financial resources are addressed towards 
the HNC, and the VMSZ takes responsibility for its distribution. Besides a lot of power that 
VMSZ got with this funding, everyone agrees that this is beneficial to the whole Hungarian 
community in Serbia, taking into account that the Serbian side covers only the HNC operational 
expenses: “If we didn’t receive any background support from Hungary, the HNC would not work 
effectively; it would probably be without any resources”61 and “However, if the Hungarian state 
wasn’t supporting us, we could not do anything... that would be a totally futile”62. 
Nevertheless, the opposition still criticises the VMSZ’s role in HNC comparing it with: 
“The VMSZ is treating the HNC as if it was a Hungarian puli dog”63 and accusing it of using kin-
state funding for its interests: “I don’t think the Hungarian state’s duty would be to sustain the 
HNC. The majority of the money goes to the VMSZ to achieve their own goals. The culture 
events the VMSZ organises are actually party events. The money put aside for the culture and 
education are invested in their own party, for party promotion... Because the parties according 
to the Serbian law cannot be financed abroad. If a party is caught on it can be banned from 
politics. The HNC is a non-governmental organisation with special authorisation, that’s why they 
can receive support from the Hungarian state”64. 
The further accusations are related to the (in) dependency of media. The opposition 
representatives are unpleased with the whole situation: “The bad news is that, the VMSZ 
manages to control all the Vojvodina Hungarian media (through the national council[s]). There 
is live broadcasting from the HNC sessions and luckily, this is how we can get the important 
                                                             
59 SERB-1.3.1, Interview with political party representative, Temerin, 18 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
60 Although, the smaller parties boycotted the elections, complaining that VMSZ has privileged status. 
61 SERB-1.2.1, Interview with political party representative, Ada, 18 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
62 SERB-2.1.1, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
63 SERB-2.1.3, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
64 SERB-2.1.4, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 16 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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thoughts to the citizens.”65 and they give the following examples: “I suggest you to look up the 
Magyar Szó, so the only Hungarian daily paper’s web page... The paper has been set to serve 
one political organisation… the VMSZ was presented in the media in 95% (due to the terms of 
reference of the national councils), while the others were only in 5%.”66. 
One of the HNC representatives suggests that “it would be better if none of the parties 
influenced the national council”67. The same idea comes from Vojvodina provincial official: 
“Sadly, politics has had very bad effects already... You know, those media which aren’t close to 
the power, hardly get any funding... now it is more about what party it supports. All the 
minorities work this way, not just the Hungarians... there are lots of problems with the 
distribution of the funding, not only in the HNC but in the other minority councils as well; the 
focus is consistently on who supports what party when distributing funding. However, it should 
have nothing to do with it. I also would like the national councils to understand that a 
transparent well established system is required. This is the problem that the negative sides of 
politics have affected the national councils”68. So, even neutral non-political side notices how 
bad is for the minority community to have political interests in the centre of their activities. 
 
3.1.3 General minority issues  
 Despite being a minority, Hungarians in Serbia do not seem to be highly discriminated 
against in general, but some of the actions to improve their lives should still be taken. The basic 
issues of Hungarians in Serbia can be classified into three groups: language use, education, and 
unemployment. All of them are connected and can lead to greater dissatisfaction, which further 
usually results in emigration. Starting from the language, Hungarian is an official language in the 
province of Vojvodina and Hungarians have a right to be supported in using their mother 
tongue. One of the HNC members said: “I have never been discriminated or suffered by any 
                                                             
65 SERB-1.2.1, Interview with political party representative, Ada, 18 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
66 SERB-1.1.2, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 17 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
67 SERB-2.2.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bačka Topola, 17 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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harm just because I am Hungarian or because I belong to a minority. And as far as I know, none 
of my friends or family experienced anything like this. Talking about our language rights, how 
we can use it or how we can’t…we could debate this for a long time. In many cases, Hungarians 
might not even live with the right that they can get an interpreter at the court, or at the 
secretariat, or at an official meeting, because they don’t need it or they might not know 
it…people don’t take advantage of these things. I don’t think we have this problem”69.  
 The Vojvodina provincial official describes how the right on mother tongue looks in 
theory and practice: “So, there should be executives who speak Hungarian language because 
according to the constitution and the statutes, each member of the Hungarian ethnic group has 
the right to address whatever executive body in Subotica or anywhere else where Hungarian is 
in official use so you can write to them in Hungarian language and receive the answer in 
Hungarian not a translation but a direct Hungarian communication. Also, any executive 
procedure for the courts or whatever also in those communities where other languages are also 
in official use, everybody has the right to ask the procedure is protected in Hungarian or remain 
and so on. So those are the areas where it is necessary to raise the level of enjoyment because 
today we have a situation where you have certain rights guaranteed by the constitution and the 
statutes. But there are some problems on practice, they cannot enjoy this right as they should 
instead be having the whole procedure; for instance, in Hungarian you have the right to the 
translator, or interpreter, but it is not the same”70. 
However, there are examples of how Hungarians see this dysfunction of the whole 
system: “A litigation at the court for instance, interpreters are provided if the judge does not 
speak Hungarian. So, it has many sides…despite the regulations guaranteeing possibilities, one 
cannot live such a complete life, as the one who belongs to a majority community; one who does 
not even think about questions like these... so, the major issue everywhere is that despite the 
regulations - which might be exceptional but - if these cannot be practiced or cannot be 
practiced in a certain way…then obviously the minority will suffer from it; and so their inferiority 
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will increase”71. Another interviewee from HNC, who said that “the language usage rights are in 
a much worse state than when they were before 1999”, gave the same example and explained it 
further: “Sadly, this means that if the judge who does not speak the minority language, the trial 
proceeds with an interpreter... This is one of the problems, the other one is that even if the trial 
at first instance is in Hungarian, the appeal proceedings cannot be in minority language. This 
means that the judge... must provide the documents in both languages, hence twice the work 
for the same pay, and because of this the clients dispense with asking the judge to do so. The 
system has been created in a way that me, a Hungarian nationalist, I dispense with the 
Hungarian language usage right as it would create further issues for myself and the judge”72. 
Besides this, the larger problem that affects more people is related to education in the 
mother tongue, especially in those rural areas from which people, both majority and minority 
massively migrate. Yet, the Serbian Hungarians notice double standards: “Problems can be the 
opening of classes, or in the matter of the continuation of a class operating in one of the 
minority languages. The same laws apply for the majority and the minority ethnicities in Serbia, 
which say that classes can only operate with 15 students or above. However, we tend to find a 
small gate in every occasion…so we think that positive discrimination should be practiced in 
education (and in the other HNC areas as well), to make sure that minority classes can operate 
in the future... Well, yes, the law applies to all of us in the same way. However, there are certain 
situations, for example in a Serb school in the countryside, a class can be opened with just a few 
students. The existence of these schools and classes should not be a question. In the case of the 
minorities, the law says that the national councils must opinionize and approve classes that 
would operate with less than 15 students”73. 
Regarding the higher education, Hungarians can study in Hungarian in Novi Sad and 
Subotica, where thanks to Hungarian kin-state support “the students with Hungarian nationality 
can receive direct funds which their colleagues - such as Serbs- could only dream about”74. 
Nevertheless, not so many Hungarians choose this and the reason is again the language: “The 
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Hungarian entry examinations haven’t been provided for years. And obviously, this is the reason 
why only a very few Hungarians get an offer from the university; only those get an offer who 
come from certain areas (such as Novi Sad or Subotica where all Hungarians speak Serbian). But 
a child from Topel75 doesn’t know Serbian. All schools teach Serbian but the students don’t learn 
much of it there. Learning Serbian in everyday life would be more important, which is easy for a 
child from Novi Sad, but very difficult for those who live in (let’s say) Topel”76. Another 
perspective that also emphasises the possible consequences: “…if we just have a look at 
Subotica or near the Tisza where the Hungarians stay, the Szeged University is in 50 kilometres, 
where all kinds of programs can be found in Hungarian. It is a strategical question what is better 
for us…the youngsters going to Subotica and continue their studies in Serbian, so by the time 
they finish primary and secondary school in Hungarian and the university in Serbian, they will 
possess an excellent knowledge in both languages, and so they stay at home. On the contrary, 
those who study at Szeged, are already planning to stay away as they would need to naturalise 
their qualification and still cannot say three sentences in Serbian; consequently, they don’t feel 
equal in this situation”77.  
The number of those who prefer to go to Hungarian universities is devastating, 
according to one of the HNC representatives: “Now out of 16 students, 14 are going to Hungary 
to continue their studies.  When we ask the reason why, they mostly say it’s the lack of Serbian 
language skills”78. Thus, another issue appears and that is the Serbian language. According to 
the Vojvodina Hungarians, the methodology of teaching Serbian is not good. However, the HNC 
also have a strong opinion against certain approaches, which could help, but are not supported: 
“If I am told that…for instance the bilingual education seems to be very productive, then I will 
protest against it, as I think the bilingual education carries the danger of assimilation; mainly 
from the Hungarian aspect”79. Anyway, the situation is as follows: “The majority thinks of it 
disdainfully; they think that the Hungarians don’t want to talk in Serbian; however, it’s not the 
                                                             
75 A town with Hungarian majority, also known as Bačka Topola. A/N 
76 SERB-2.2.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bačka Topola, 17 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
77 SERB-2.1.1, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
78 SERB-2.3.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bečej, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
79 SERB-2.1.1, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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Hungarians’ fault but it is the system that does not work”80. The interviewees notice that: “It is 
a very interesting question as the students learn English really well or even German but not 
Serbian which is actually taught more times a week than foreign languages. Those who know it 
better than I do, they say that Serbian isn’t taught as a foreign language but as a native 
language. Now, the HNC wants to change this concept since we see it does not work. It is a very 
interesting fact that the students learn English really well; simply the methodology isn’t 
adequate”81. Also, a representative of HNC concludes that: “The problem is not that we need to 
speak in Serbian - because that is absolutely natural as we live in a multilingual community... 
The problem isn’t this, but the youngsters not being able to talk in Serbian is a very big issue”82. 
There are other, different perspectives as well and they are related to the employability 
of those who do not speak Serbian: “Probably getting a job is a very big problem which isn’t 
only an issue for the majority nation but the minority as well by having serious problems with 
the lack of Serbian language skills. Only at a very few places in Serbia can someone find a job 
without speaking the language of the majority. I think it is historical how many Hungarians 
don’t speak Serbian. Even if they do, it is not up to an adequate level”83. So, the Hungarians who 
decide to go and study in Hungary, due to poor knowledge of Serbian do not see the 
perspective of coming back and finding a job: “No matter where you want a job, you need to 
speak Serbian; even in Hungarian inhabited areas... They can’t work, as everyone needs to 
speak Serbian for negotiating with businesses, serving customers who don’t speak any other 
languages. Meeting Serbians is unavoidable”84. 
The Serbian poor economic situation, which further leads to emigration certainly 
influences these processes, no matter how hard the state tries to help the minority 
communities: “In the last 20-25 years minority citizens from the public sector have been 
disappearing, not just the Hungarians but citizens of all minorities. Last year, a law passed 
which reflects positive discrimination: If someone from the majority and also someone from a 
                                                             
80 SERB-3.1.2, Interview with Vojvodina provincial official, Novi Sad, 13 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
81 SERB-2.3.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bečej, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
82 SERB-2.2.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bačka Topola, 17 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
83 SERB-2.3.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bečej, May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
84 SERB-2.1.3, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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minority community possess the same qualifications and apply for the same council or provincial 
vacancy, then the minority citizen shall be offered the job. This is positive discrimination”85. 
Nevertheless, this does not seem enough to keep people from migrating. The massive 
emigration indirectly makes the everyday life of the ones who stay even more complicated: 
“The biggest problem is that lots of people go abroad and try to find their happiness there either 
alone or with their whole family. This obviously influences the number of children, students and 
schools. We need to face it; only a few of us remained here by now. From year to year, the 
number of students decreases with hundreds in our secondary schools and universities. And we 
know what it means; so if the number of students decrease, then the teacher’s work is 
decreasing as well, which slowly leads to the teacher being unemployed, which again leads 
more people going abroad... We’re trying to encourage the families to stay, also emphasising 
that working abroad doesn’t always mean one can get a job suiting one’s qualification”86. 
The conclusion is that the economic situation is a major problem of the Hungarian 
community, and it is something that they have in common with the majority Serbians. Being 
preoccupied with the existential problems makes minorities apathetic about other things: “It 
means that there isn’t enough money... They don’t complain about the violation of the minority 
law in such numbers as before, but complain in bigger numbers about matters originating from 
the state of the economy... The members of the minority communities in such difficult times 
don’t n[ot]ice the violation of the minority rights as they are struggling with existential matters 
and that’s what they complain about. Since quite a few citizens don’t have any pension, of 
course they don’t care if a Hungarian sign has been knocked off. This is a typical trend”87. 
 
3.1.4 Emigration 
 The economic situation of a home country indeed plays the main role in the survival of a 
certain community in their home state. The case of Serbian Hungarians is not an exception. 
                                                             
85 SERB-1.1.1, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
86 SERB-2.1.2, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 17 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
87 SERB-3.1.2, Interview with Vojvodina provincial official, Novi Sad, 13 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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After including all of the other issues described above, as well as the Hungarian kin-state 
support’s ‘most powerful’ instrument, the dual citizenship, it is clear why emigration is so 
popular nowadays. It is very difficult to stop this trend: “Well, the biggest challenge is to keep 
the youngsters here somehow…to change what is in their heads somehow. They think whatever 
is here is bad and everything that is beyond the border is good and they just want to leave and 
continue their lives there. I don’t know who the last one will be in the row. If all of those who 
leave would be successful…but sadly they aren’t... From one point of view the population is 
decreasing naturally, and secondly it is also decreasing because the youngsters are leaving”88. 
 The dual citizenship helped this whole process and led to a certain contradiction 
between what the kin-state wants89 and what it does. One of the aims is to fight for wider 
rights and autonomy of Hungarian communities abroad and by doing so, keeping them in their 
historical lands. But, the right to get dual citizenship showed that Hungarians anyway choose to 
leave. However, some see also positive sides of this trend: “...many of the applications for the 
Hungarian citizenship weren’t to migrate but it meant a lot to the people, on a psychological 
and me[n]tal level. It brought them satisfaction... At the beginning, the Hungarians only applied 
for it to satisfy their ethnicity feelings but now many of them have already used it to move 
abroad”90. And that seems to be a common opinion among interviewees: “Well, despite it being 
a positive step from the point of how Vojvodina Hungarians feel about their national identity, 
other aspects need to be mentioned as well. There is not much research, nor many scientific 
papers published on this subject; however it can be empirically defined that the growing 
immigration of Hungarians from Vojvodina has a close connection to the possibility of receiving 
a Hungarian passport”91. 
 The consequences of this can be fatal for the future of the Hungarian community in 
Serbia, and interviewees are well aware of this: “The interest of the Hungarian community is 
that the Vojvodina Hungarians should not receive Hungarian citizenship. 10,000s have already 
left the country since it is easy to leave and get a job… of course people take an advantage of it. 
                                                             
88 SERB-2.2.1, Interview with HNC representative, Bačka Topola, 17 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
89 Or at least says what it wants. 
90 SERB-3.1.2, Interview with Vojvodina provincial official, Novi Sad, 13 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
91 SERB-1.1.1, Interview with political party representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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The interest of the community isn’t equal to the interest of the individual. The personal interest 
of the people is obviously to leave if they can’t make ends meet... Obviously, it would be very 
difficult to tell anyone that one doesn’t have a right to leave but must stay”92. Some even use 
adjectives as catastrophic to describe the current situation: “Catastrophic because we are 
becoming empty. It is great, and we really appreciate the [that] we are welcomed to be 
Hungarian citizens since our ancestors appeared to have been locked out of their own country; 
in theory, it is fine. But in practice, since 2008, there has been a decreasing standard of living, 
people put up with this for a while, but they can’t any longer. Thousands of young Hungarians 
are leaving as there is a huge existential uncertainty; this is the easier way, as working in the EU 
becomes a possibility for them. And I don’t think it will change... We simply have to face that the 
law is defacto and objective, carrying the death sentence of the Hungarian community here”93. 
 Despite the negatives, one positive side still can be seen and the Hungarian government 
is working hard on it, as part of its kin-state politics. It is related to the economic support of the 
region and its community: “In the Carpathians, only Vojvodina succeeded to implement the 
Economic Development Plan, the ‘50 billion HUF Plan’ as it is mentioned in Hungary. The 
Hungarian government awarded a support package worth of more than 160 million euro (50 
billion HUF) for the implementation of the Economic Development Strategy for Hungarians in 
Vojvodina. The first round of applications for funding was launched last January, and the second 
round of funding has already been released too. These are 15 types of funding for entrepreneurs 
and agricultural producers, which are only for citizens with dual Hungarian and Serb nationality 
and who live in Vojvodina”94. The results are yet to be seen.  
 
3.2 Discussion 
The findings clearly show what are the most important problems of the Hungarian 
community, seen from their perspective. Some of them are related and to a certain extent 
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93 SERB-2.1.3, Interview with HNC representative, Subotica, 19 May 2016. In: (Smith, 2020) 
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directly or indirectly caused by Hungarian kin-state support; while the others, more existential 
ones are the result of Serbian domestic politics and economy.  
While these findings are yet to contribute to the study of the matter, the literature on 
the most important themes was already cited in the previous chapter: 
(A) The issues of Hungarian cultural autonomy, specifics of the Vojvodina region, as well as the 
position of kin-states, can be found in works of Bárdi (2004), Egry (2014), Korhecz (2014), 
Waterbury (2020), etc; and were cited before. Also, the Hungarian government had a say about 
it in its Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2011), where the case of 
Vojvodina is singled out as positive. 
(B) The political interest of kin-state activism is another topic that is well covered in the 
literature, especially the one concerning the Hungarian case. A big contribution regarding the 
political aspects can be found in numerous works of Waterbury (2010) and Pogonyi (2017). The 
specifics of Vojvodina Hungarians’ political parties are mentioned in works of Stjepanović 
(2018), Herner-Kovács, Illyés, & Rákóczi (2015), Hagan Darin (2009) as well as in numerous 
newspaper articles and web portals (Trivić, 2018) (Ivković, 2020).  
(C) There is not much information about the general, everyday problems of Vojvodina 
Hungarians. But, the issues that minorities usually face, such as the ones related to mother 
tongue and education are common in the literature and can be found in already mentioned 
works of Kymlicka (1995), Csergő & Goldgeier (2001), Kántor (2006), Kapitány (2015), etc. 
(D) Finally, the most important issue that includes to a certain extent all the others is 
emigration, with all its consequences. In the literature, there are various works on the survival 
of ethnic Hungarian communities and they are analysed previously as well. The most relevant 
information is provided by Bárdi (2013), Wimmer (2013), Kapitány (2015), etc. Since the topic is 
ongoing, many online news articles are also available, while some of them are mentioned 
earlier (Keller-Alánt, 2020). 
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The judgment that can be made is that these issues are causally related and 
interconnected. Therefore, they can be presented through a story: Hungary, a kin-state that is 
an important, EU neighbour of poorer Serbia requires wider autonomy for its ethnic kin. Serbia 
wants to prove its democratic development as part of its EU integration process95. So, it 
provides the Hungarian community (as well as other ones) with the (Hungarian) National 
Council, an institute that protects the rights, language, and culture of the Hungarian minority 
and it is run by individuals elected by the Hungarian community. But, the act on HNC has some 
flaws and the financial support is not enough. HNC also serves as a link between Serbian and 
Hungarian states and allows the funding from the Hungarian government, which pulls Serbian 
Hungarians even closer to Budapest. This considerable funding is distributed through the most 
supported group of Hungarians in Serbia, the minority political party VMSZ. One of the main 
purposes of Hungarian kin-state support is the political influence, so maintaining the good ties 
with the leading Serbian Hungarian political party is of mutual interest. On the other hand, 
these individuals and groups who do not support VMSZ struggle and feel that they are left on 
the margins. The polarisation among Hungarians as well as the efforts from Budapest to 
dominate and control minority elites, pushes VMSZ also closer to the Serbian leading political 
party, making them part of the elite and the Serbian Parliament. Meanwhile, ordinary 
Hungarians deal with existential problems and put them way in front of the problems related to 
the possible violation of their minority rights. In general, they do not feel discriminated, but the 
improvements in mother tongue use and education still should be made, as well as the 
methodology of teaching the Serbian language in schools, especially in the areas where 
Hungarians live homogeneously. The education and usage of minority language rights are 
closely connected to the number of Hungarians living in the area. And on this field, Hungarians 
do not do so well, since many of them left and still are constantly leaving for Hungary and other 
EU countries. The main reason for wide Hungarian emigration is the economic situation in non-
EU Serbia and difficulties when finding employment. While the main tool that helps Hungarian 
emigration is the dual citizenship right, which they can and do obtain thanks to Hungarian kin-
state support. Hungary’s goal is to keep Hungarians in their historical lands, so they constantly 
                                                             
95 Along with, being pressured domestically by different national minorities and externally pressured by the EU and 
the CoE to develop the new legal-institutional framework of minority protection. 
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increase the level of funding intended for the economic prosperity of the regions where 
Hungarians live, being aware that this is the most effective way to stop economic migration. 
Hence, everything starts and finishes with Hungarian kin-state support. Nevertheless, certain 
contradictions are evident, such as the fact that Hungary wants to keep Hungarians in 
Vojvodina and give them non-resident citizenship, which also allows them to vote and bring 
Hungarian leading party political profit; it instead leads to massive Hungarian emigration, 















Chapter 4 CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this research, four research questions and four hypotheses were 
suggested. To draw an overall conclusion, it is necessary to look at all of them again and give 
the answers obtained through the thorough analysis of primary and secondary data. The overall 
conclusion will be followed by the recommendations, which represent the ultimate, inseparable 
part of this research analysis. 
 
4.1 The purpose of Hungarian kin-state support 
The kin-state support/activism/politics is a very complex phenomenon, and the case of 
Hungary represents a very interesting one. Hungary used to be a very big country in the 
European context, but historical developments led to territorial changes and left many 
Hungarians on the other side of the border. The concept of the Hungarian nation has been on 
the agenda for a long time and the period under communism just increased the importance of 
its promotion. The post-communist period built the foundation of the kin-state politics that 
exist today. The main purpose of Hungarian kin-state support can be divided into two groups: 
the general, well-known ones such as helping the compatriots in the neighbouring countries, by 
allocating certain financial resources for the preservation and protection of the unique 
Hungarian culture and language abroad; and also another, less evident one, which is driven by 
political interests. Moreover, under Fidesz governments the official term for kin-state politics 
has become ‘nemzetpolitika’ (national policy) referring to the idea that the government has 
managed to ‘unify’ the nation across borders. So in a nutshell, they no longer speak about kin 
minorities, just parts of the unitary (ethnic-cultural) nation which has been now also 
institutionalized (status law, dual citizenship, etc.). Numerous examples testify the argument 
that the main tacit purpose behind such wide Hungarian kin-state support is the political 
benefit. Fidesz managed to identify this on time and positioned itself as a leader in this means 
of a political game. The right decisions regarding Status Law, as well as amendments on non-
resident Citizenship and Voting Laws, played a major role in establishing the political 
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dominance that it holds since 2010. Fidesz was very direct, determined, and did not waste time 
when it came to these decisions. Orbán was the best in cherry-picking of the both, culturo-
linguistic and political benefits that came with the support of ethnic kin. He and his party 
promote nationalism and enjoy the support of both, internal and external voters. The political 
aspect of Hungarian kin-state support helped Fidesz to keep its ethnic kin as close to Budapest 
as possible. 
 
4.2 The types of Hungarian kin-state support 
Hungary offers multiple benefits to its ethnic kin. The more important it was for ruling 
parties to keep Hungarians abroad loyal to kin-state, the more powerful benefits were 
introduced. The history of Hungarian kin-state activism can be divided into two periods that 
include Fidesz’s rule: the pre-2010 and post-2010’s period. Both periods are characterised by 
the expansion of kin-state activism when some of the milestones occurred. The earlier period 
introduced a very controversial Status Law and the establishment of The Hungarian Standing 
Conference. Some of the neighbouring countries were afraid that the Status Law will allow 
Hungary to influence another state’s sovereignty. However, the most valuable benefit that was 
offered through Status Law was the Hungarian identity card, which allowed Hungarians from 
neighbouring countries to enter Hungary without a visa, but also provided them with a wide 
range of opportunities, such as education grants, work permits, access to health care and social 
security, etc. They could technically apply for the same state benefits as Hungarians from 
Hungary. The later period brought the Hungarian identity card to the highest level. Immediately 
upon the return to power, Fidesz adopts the law on non-resident dual citizenship and voting 
rights and makes the process of gaining it so easy. This was welcomed by the vast majority of 
Hungarians abroad since for many this did not only mean the Hungarian passport, but also the 
EU one. And by gaining the voting rights, ethnic Hungarians officially got the opportunity to 
shape Hungarian internal political life. By late 2017 already one million ethnic Hungarians 
gained non-resident citizenship. The fact that also non-Hungarians are applying for dual 
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citizenship testifies how powerful this type of kin-state support is. Besides these, Hungary also 
invests a lot of resources in the economy, education, and culture of its kin-minority 
communities abroad. 
 
4.3 The main issues of Vojvodina Hungarians 
Primary data showed that the issues of Vojvodina Hungarians can be divided into four 
groups. The ones related to autonomy, politics, language and education; and finally emigration. 
But, the most dominant one that shapes all the others is the economy of their home state. The 
autonomy is established through the Hungarian National Council, which is primarily financed by 
Hungary. The HNC is representative of its minority body, but, it is impotent in terms of decision 
making. Hungarian politics in Vojvodina are largely VMSZ oriented, due to its obvious 
dominance and support that enjoys from both, SNS and Fidesz. This leads to dissatisfaction of 
their political opponents, who feel as a ‘minority within a minority’. Some of the general issues 
are related to the mother tongue usage and the need for more support in this field. 
Additionally, the lack of knowledge of the Serbian language is something that Vojvodina 
Hungarians face. This makes them less employable, thus turns them further towards Hungary 
and the EU labour market. The more Hungarians leave Serbia, the more difficult is for the 
remaining ones to enjoy more opportunities regarding education in their mother tongue. 
Nevertheless, all these issues seem to be in a background of existential problems that minority 
face. In this situation, they are not in any different situation than the majority. The difference is 
that Hungarians can use their dual citizenship and leave.  
 
4.4 Overall conclusion: The reality of Hungarian kin-state support 
The analysis and comparison of primary and secondary data showed that the most 
important issues of Hungarian kin-minority in Serbia are not solved by kin-state support, but 
only worsen in some cases or simply postponed. The Hungarian political life in Vojvodina is to 
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some extent corrupted by higher political interests, while the possibility to obtain Hungarian 
citizenship leads to massive emigration, which does not necessarily solve the main issues, but 
just move them somewhere else. One of the initial and basic aims of Hungarian kin-state 
activism is to keep ethnic Hungarians in their historical lands surrounding Hungary. But, over 
time the level of Hungarian kin-state support was increasing and led to a contradictory situation 
today. When taking into account all of the interests behind the Hungarian kin state support, a 
certain ‘enchanted’ circle is being formed. First, Hungary emphasises the importance of ethnic 
kin, stressing out its actual ethnic affiliation and decides to invest resources in its cultural 
preservation and survival in countries across the state border. Then, the Hungarian elite realises 
the political potential of the loyalty of non-resident Hungarians and offers numerous benefits to 
ethnic kin which pulls it closer to the kin-state and brings political points. So, it gradually 
increases the level of support by offering dual citizenship and voting rights, which strengthen 
the ties and political power. But, the dual citizenship also opens the door for the economic 
migration, so the survival of ethnic kin abroad is endangered, so it is the control that kin-state 
used to have in these areas. After realising that its political appetites led to the situation such as 
this, the Hungarian government starts investing more resources in the economic development 
of kin-minority communities, which is supposed to keep them in their home state. The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a difference between how each side of the kin-
state-support-medal coin seems from two perspectives, what are the expectations and ultimate 
aims. Thus, it is very important to take into account what matters to ethnic kin and according to 
that shape, the kin-state politics, since their existence and success primarily depend on kin-
minority.  
Regarding the suggested hypotheses, the conclusion is that: It is valid that (H1) The 
more the kin-state support focuses on political interests, the more of actual issues of 
(Vojvodina Hungarian) minority are unsolved; It is also valid that (H2) The more issues a 
minority faces in the home country, the more support it expects from kin-state; Another mostly 
valid one is (H3) The more the minority relies on and uses the support of a kin-state, the more 
likely is to be caught in the middle between the kin-state and home state. And finally, (H4) The 
more privileges kin-state support offers to its minority in another country, the more is the 
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minority encouraged to leave the home state, is valid. The overall analysis proved that all four 
hypotheses can be considered valid. 
 
4.5 Recommendations 
Regarding the recommendations, they are primarily addressed to Hungary. To practice 
kin-state politics successfully, it is necessary to sometimes put politics aside and consider the 
actual position and matters of the ethnic community as a whole, not only elites; since the 
decisions are supposed to benefit everyone equally. It seems that the right approach is to invest 
in kin-minority future by improving their economic situation within the home state. Also, the 
overall status of the minority can be significantly better if the minority community focuses 
more on its integration in the home country than to the constant maintenance of a rather 
dependent relationship with its kin-state. Finally, the strengthening of bilateral relationships 
with neighbouring countries can significantly improve the status of the remaining Hungarian 
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